WarSclerotic

Netanyahu and Barak climbing down.

The more the date gets closer, it becomes clearer that these are the most important elections in the history of the state of Israel – the election campaign taking place far beyond the sea, in the United States, of course.

It was supposed to have been different: Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu received an important statement from US President Barack Obama in May 2010, according to which “Israel has a right to defend itself on its own.” However, statements and reality differ. The US actually finds it inopportune  for Israel to launch an independent attack operation in Iran at this time.

How did we reach a situation where Netanyahu spoke this week about ‘red lines’ that would allow Israel to avoid an attack in Iran in the coming months (while arranging an awkward ladder for himself and for Ehud Barak so they can descend from the tall tree they climbed up on)? To understand this, one needs to return to the start of the summer.

The tension discussed in Israel towards a possible attack in Iran was authentic. The round of appointments planned in the General Staff was delayed, even though the summer is the season for role exchange. Thus, for example, Maj. Gen. Ya’akov Ayash remained as head of the Operations Branch, and was not replaced by Maj. Gen. Yoav Har Even, who was intended to replace him. In addition, Ayash did not depart for his next role as IDF attaché in Washington).

Throughout the past few weeks, Netanyahu and Barak fanned the media flames on the issue of an Iranian strike. There were illegitimate purposes to that (Netanyahu apparently believes that a defense agenda is preferable to an economic one near an election year) and legitimate ones (pressuring the US and the West to act with greater determination against Iran’s nuclear program and Iran itself – to halt the race towards a bomb).

Did Netanyahu and Barak seriously consider an attack in the coming fall? It’s possible that they didn’t know themselves, but in any case, like many other past sophisticated efforts by Ehud Barak, this one went wrong as well.

The snowball that brought about a severe tear in the relations between Israel and the US began rolling due to the firm background debriefing given by Ehud Barak to Nachum Barnea and Shimon Shefer of Yedioth Aharonot and several other journalists. The Americans were not fond of the voices coming from Jerusalem, to say the least (the US embassy itself was busy throughout the last summer, debriefing Israeli journalists to convey through them the message that Israel has no reason to attack, and that it has someone to trust). One way or another, when the US is angry, the ground trembles. The US chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the secretary of defense and embassy persons delivered firm messages to Israel against the attack. The US-Israeli strategic relations seemed as though they were taking a beating. This is how instead of pressuring the US, the pressure is primarily discernible in the prime minister’s bureau in Jerusalem.

Red lines?
What is the significant of the red lines that Netanyahu talked about this week? In truth, there is no such line, not on a timeline, and not in some geographic point. To keep the issue as vague as possible, his people spoke in Jerusalem this week of how if Barack Obama would vocally commit to the US not allowing Iran to become nuclear; if the economic sanctions are intensified (they suddenly remembered in Jerusalem that the sanctions are pressuring the Ayatollah regime in one way or another); and if the threat of a US attack would become tangible to Iranian eyes – then Israel will not have to attack in the coming months.

It was also recalled that in 2003, Iran’s nuclear program was frozen for two years against the backdrop of the US invasion of Iraq and genuine concern that Iran would be next in line to be dealt with by the US in the framework of the “Axis of Evil.” The words of the Israeli officials primarily created anticipation towards President Obama’s speech at the Democratic party convention this week.

Another fact: There is nothing to actually build upon true red lines. The US is neck-deep in its elections, and only wants to shake the Israeli nuisance until after November. No matter how you look at it, Israel is simply folding, unless everything isn’t as it seems (which is also an option).

Cabinet
The reports about Netanyahu’s resolve to investigate the leak from Tuesday’s cabinet meeting which discussed the Iranian issue should also be read cautiously. As a rule, any word regarding Iran is suspected of disinformation, so the focus should be directed at what is certain: the Israeli government has never discussed the possibility of an attack against Iran. It has not been presented with all the possible options for an operation and their various significances. The intelligence organizations view this forum as less classified than off-the-record background meetings with media representatives.

Speaking of the intelligence organizations, the reports about disagreements surrounding the Iranian issue are correct. The differences in approaches are ‘natural’. They all see the overall picture in a fairly similar manner. Disagreements, even personal ones, between the members of the military echelon and the members of the political echelon have always existed, and will apparently also continue to exist. Netanyahu is guarantied a majority in the cabinet forum (approximately 19 ministers) for any decision found appropriate, so long as it is supported by the IDF.

Another fact: the political-security cabinet has held dozens of closed deliberations on the Iranian issue (not including “the discussion”, the one where the operational options will be inspected). There are usually no leaks from this forum, which includes about eight ministers. There is a tie in this forum, as of today, on the issue of the possible attack: four on the supporter’s camp, led by Barak and Netanyahu, and the objectors, led by Benny Begin, Dan Meridor and Moshe Ya’alon, which number four as well.

Russia Renounces
Sometimes it happens that news of significant, far-reaching historic and defensive significance vanish from the media’s attention. It is possible that in retrospect it will turn out that Russia’s call for its citizens to leave Syria this week will turn out to have such a significance.

The reason that elements within the defense establishment attribute considerable importance to this call is the fact that Israel and the West have been expecting for months now to see when Russia will renounce Bashar al-Assad. Each day where Russia continues to support a regime that massacres its citizens results in strategic damage to Russia’s relations with the rest of the Arab world and with the future regime that will be established in Syria. Russia is aware of this, but on the other hand, it is important for it to show the whole world that it does not abandon its allies (like the quick US renouncement of Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt, for example).

Intelligence elements in Israel anticipated seeing when Russia will initially begin to evacuate its military advisors from Syria, and when it will clear its forces from the Tartus port (the only port where it has a friendly pier in the Mediterranean Sea). This may a clear sign to the fact that Bashar Assad’s regime is over and done with. These steps have not yet happened, but the call for the civilians to leave Syria might soon turn out to be a clear indication towards Russia’s renouncing of Syria.

Given this, the reports that Assad is organizing a shelter for himself in Russia towards the day he relinquishes the regime seem considerably authentic. The scenario that Assad might leave to Russia is certainly logical.
Bedrock of our existence
And now, without a shred of cynicism: There are governmental ceremonies that cause quite a bit of excitement, and in my opinion, such is the ceremony held each year in September on the lawn of the President’s house in Jerusalem, where the Israeli defense awards are granted.

Thus, on Monday, when dozens of the award recipients stood upon the stage of honor to receive the award, I was exited for them, and a thought crossed my mind; how lucky are we that while tens of thousands of people invest their efforts towards unfounded hatred and pointless discussions on whether or not the defense budget is a waste of money, we have several thousands of people who are the technological basis for Israel’s military might.

The explosion of IQ on the stage at the President’s residence on Thursday was tremendous. The winners received the award from the president, the ministry of defense and the chief of staff, with the picture of Eliyahu Golomb, the IDF’s first force builder, in the background. The media gave its full attention to the only award winners whose contribution to Israel’s security could be mentioned: those involved in the technologically unprecedented project which transformed an active defense system against missiles in a record time of less than two and a half months.

However, additional development persons from IAI were also on the stage, as well as several geniuses from the IAF and the Intelligence branch who were involved in other projects – all of which could be said about them is that they have had a tremendous contribution to Israel’s security, and that those involved in them displayed tremendous daring and rare creative originality. It can only be guessed that they are projects connected to the Iranian issue.

One last note about the Iron Dome project, the great star of the Israeli defense awards. The chairman of the prize committee, Maj. Gen. Danny Yatom, rightfully reminded the contribution of Amir Peretz, who insisted on advancing the project during his term as minister of defense. In retrospect, the fact that the project only started in 2008 cannot be considered as less than stupidity. A reminder – the rockets already began landing in Israel’s southern region in 2000. In 2004 there was a main headline in Ma’ariv by this writer about a secret project for developing a system against missiles (the project was so confidential that it was denied by elements in the ministry of defense who weren’t even aware of it). Even though the technological feasibility was already given in 2004, the project only started during Peretz’s term, and without the active support of the IAF, which preferred investing the money in more offensive measures.

This is presented as food for thought for those who object to any project out of a short-sighted budgetary view (after all, the project to establish the fence at the Egyptian border could have originally started years ago were it budgeted in time, instead of being carried out at record speed and greater cost today).

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