WarSclerotic

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the members of the ‎Diplomatic-Security Cabinet, who toured the Israel-Lebanon border on ‎Tuesday, were the first to hear about the fifth Hezbollah terror tunnel ‎snaking under the security fence. ‎

News of the discovery officially broke only on Thursday, after the IDF ‎had destroyed the underground passageway, along with a somewhat ‎laconic report on the progress of Operation Northern Shield saying that ‎the effort to neutralize the tunnel threat was nearing its end.‎

IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot and GOC Northern Command ‎Maj. Gen. Yoel Strick briefed the ministers on the operation’s progress, ‎underscoring the fact that the IDF has effectively deprived Hezbollah of ‎a unique, strategic asset that would have allowed it to mark significant ‎gains in the next conflict: psychologically, knowing that active Hezbollah ‎tunnels run under Israeli communities adjacent to the northern border ‎could have potentially caused public panic in the sector; but worse, ‎operationally, these tunnels would have allowed the Shiite terrorist ‎group to potentially use a brutal tactical gambit to declare war on Israel ‎‎– as they would have allowed them to overrun one of the communities ‎and abduct or murder numerous Israelis. ‎

Eizenkot and Strick made it clear to the ministers that Hezbollah may be ‎down – but it is by no means out and that, having lost its tunnel ‎enterprise, it will undoubtedly turn its attention to devising new ways ‎with which to challenge Israel in the next war.‎

It is unclear to what extent this information troubled the ministers, if at ‎all. They were familiar with the tunnel threat and authorized the ‎operation to destroy them, but on Tuesday – a day after snap elections‎were called and set for April 19 and a day before the vote on the ‎dissolution of the 20th Knesset – they were likely far more preoccupied ‎with politics. ‎

Reporters who were invited to join the tour couldn’t help but notice the ‎unofficial game of musical chairs that saw the ministers compete for who ‎got to sit the closest to Netanyahu during the briefing and who got to ‎stand right next to him in the various photo-ops. ‎

These scenes were obscured by the political firestorm of recent days, but ‎they were enough to put the IDF on alert: In any election campaign, the ‎military is wary of being used as a political tool. Base and border tours ‎and visiting soldiers in the various sectors are classic photo-ops for any ‎politician, and given the tensions simmering on all sectors, there is no ‎shortage of such opportunities. Given that the new chief of staff, Aviv ‎Kochavi, is slated to assume his duties in 18 days, the IDF’s efforts to ‎keep itself out of the political game will be even more challenging, ‎especially at a time when there are plenty of reasons for meetings with ‎the political echelon.‎

The alleged Israeli strike in Syria, which according to foreign media ‎reports targeted several ‎Hezbollah ‎leaders as well as Iranian ‎ammunition ‎‎depots near ‎Damascus, is sure to also be linked to the elections, but it is ‎important to clarify that that is not the case. ‎

Operations of this kind usually require rapid planning, meaning they are ‎formulated from the ground up: Military Intelligence often makes its ‎determinations in real-time and relays it to the chief of staff, who has to ‎greenlight a plan of action, which is prepared while the political echelon ‎is briefed on the matter and is required to approve it. ‎

This is a ritual in which the IDF is well-versed, and the government ‎almost always backs the proposed operational plans. This is a familiar, ‎intimate dance between the military and governing echelons and it is ‎devoid of any political cynicism. ‎

The Israeli public knows only about the end part of this process. Were ‎more of it made public, the arguments accusing the military of holding ‎back on its use of force would subside. Contrary to the Israeli take on ‎things, the sides taking the blows – Syria, Hezbollah and Iran – think ‎Israel is borderline “crazy” and Russia has even gone on the record as ‎saying that the “Israeli aggression must be restrained.” ‎

This week’s strike took place against the backdrop of these familiar elements, but this was ‎not “just” another strike of an Iranian weapons convoy en route to ‎Hezbollah. The technical details, namely the nature of the target and the ‎method of attack, were perhaps routine – as far as a raid of this nature ‎could be routine – but all the rest was unusual. Israel used it to make it ‎clear, in no uncertain terms, that it was serious when it said it would take ‎action to maintain its security interests, regardless of any foreign actor’s presence in the Middle East. ‎

This message was intended for many ears, not just the obvious ones in ‎Tehran, Damascus, and Beirut, but mainly those in Moscow and ‎Washington. ‎

U.S. President Trump’s decision to withdraw American troops from Syria ‎met a mix of surprise, disappointment and concern in Israel, as while the ‎Americans did not protect our security interest directly, their presence in ‎Syria was enough to cool the engines of the Iranian-Syrian axis, and it ‎provided a crucial balance to the overt Russian belligerence.‎

The feeling in Jerusalem was that Israel was “left on its own,” which is not ‎the end of the world, but it certainly makes for a very complex and ‎volatile situation. ‎

Russia is no longer willing to turn a blind eye to Israeli raids, not because ‎it is rooting for Iran, but because it needs and wants calm on the ground ‎so it can enjoy the fruits of Syria’s economic rehabilitation. As far as ‎Moscow is concerned, the equation is simple: more raids equal a ‎regional mess, which in turn means less money. ‎

Since the ‎Sept. 17 incident in which a Russian reconnaissance ‎plane was ‎downed by Syrian aid defenses responding to an Israeli airstrike, Israel has ‎spared no effort to improve its relations with Russia, and while the ‎Kremlin has been anything but warm and fuzzy, it has made it a point to ‎maintain the deconfliction channel set up between the IDF and the ‎Russian forces in Syria. Still, while Israel has been able to maintain some ‎operational leeway, it has substantially narrowed. ‎

Russia did not spare Israel its criticism over Wednesday’s raid. Some of ‎this was meant for Syria’s ears, as Damascus must be wondering why ‎Moscow doesn’t simply order Israel to halt all strikes, and for Israel’s ‎ears, as the Kremlin believes the IDF is exercising excessive force. For whatever ‎reason, Russia refrains from doing the simple and obvious thing of all – ‎preventing Iranian activity – which is the source of all evil, in Syria. ‎

Military Intelligence assessment of 2019 states that the likelihood of war ‎in the northern sector remains low: Syria has no interest in one and ‎neither does Iran or Hezbollah, certainly after the group’s tunnel project ‎has been destroyed. But the area remains a tinderbox and the slightest ‎spark could ignite it and drag all parties into a conflict no one desires. ‎

The likelihood of war will further increase if Hezbollah accelerates the ‎development of its precision-missile program on Lebanese soil. Israel will ‎continue with its public diplomacy and diplomatic campaign, as it has ‎done in recent months, but it may find that military moves are ‎unavoidable, regardless of their inherent risk. This is a likely scenario ‎with which cabinet ministers are familiar. It will require military ‎preparation, which takes place routinely, but also preparations in terms ‎of domestic and international legitimacy. ‎

This has many implications, two of which are especially important during ‎this period: first, the need to leave no stone unturned in order to reach ‎understandings with Russia, and second, fostering public confidence – ‎not an easy task during election time, when every statement is ‎perceived as part of a political campaign. ‎

The key to success on both fronts is a clean and practical process focused ‎on leaving the IDF and the decision-making process outside the election ‎campaign.‎