WarSclerotic

Let’s make something clear: This week’s countertunnel operation on ‎the northern border did not defeat Hezbollah but rather was another ‎round in the complex, long and tumultuous battle the parties have ‎been waging for decades. ‎

This round seems to go to Israel, but things are far from over. ‎Hezbollah may have lost a significant strategic asset but it is far from ‎giving up, and this setback will not be what decides the next military ‎campaign. In fact, this is not even a tie-breaker – at most this is ‎another important marker in a long line of events that date back to the ‎early 1980s, which has no end in sight.‎

From the IDF’s point of view, Operation Northern Shield is just that – ‎a full-scale operation in every respect, from intelligence gathering and ‎employing engineering technology, to the deployment on the ground ‎and dealing with any military, diplomatic and operational ‎implications; all seeking to inflict maximum damage on Hezbollah and ‎create maximum leverage for Israel, and all flawlessly executed thus ‎far. ‎

Keeping things in perspective is important, and calling military ‎engineering activities on the Israeli side of the border an “operation” ‎may be a bit of a stretch – to Israeli ears, the word “operation” ‎conjures up images of something daring and heroic, not those of ‎bulldozers excavating a tunnel – but the attempts by politicians to ‎dwarf the IDF’s achievement are nonetheless very strange. ‎

Reuters

One may criticize the broader contexts of the operation, from the ‎decision to avoid a more severe response to the violence in Gaza to ‎the decision not to neutralize the tunnels’ end on Lebanese soil, but the ‎contempt for the operation itself was odd, and proved that in 2018 ‎Israel, even matters of security are all about politics. ‎

Hezbollah’s tunnel project can be traced back to 2014. Reeling from ‎Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, Hamas decided to accelerate its ‎terror tunnels’ project. The information gathered by them was ‎eventually handed over to Hezbollah – through Iran, no doubt – ‎which decided to begin a tunneling project of its own. ‎

The IDF understood the challenge and especially its lacking ability to ‎meet it. When IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot took office in ‎February 2015, he made the tunnel threat a top priority and set up ‎technological-intelligence-operational teams to find a holistic solution ‎to the problem.

It is likely that Eizenkot’s insistence to launch ‎Operation Northern Shield at this time despite the recommendations ‎of several General Staff officers, stemmed from his desire to see this ‎through and not leave the problem for his successor, Aviv Kochavi, ‎who will take office in mid-January.‎

At the time, the IDF’s decision to form a special task force to tackle the ‎tunnel issue was oblivious to the fact that Hezbollah had embarked on ‎a tunneling project near the Lebanon-Israel border. Even within the ‎Shiite terrorist group, the project was top secret and only a handful of ‎senior officials knew about it. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah ‎wanted to keep the information on a need-to-know basis precisely to ‎avoid the kind of intelligence breach that stunned the group this week.‎

The military began gathering actionable intelligence on ‎Hezbollah tunneling project two years ago. The village of Kafr Kila in ‎south Lebanon, where the IDF identified digging operations, was ‎placed under 24/7 surveillance, revealing the slow but steady progress ‎made by Hezbollah. ‎

And slow and steady progress it was: Unlike in Gaza, the ground near ‎the northern border is rocky and tough, not sandy and yielding. ‎This allowed Hezbollah maximum progress of about six feet a week, ‎which in turn, allowed the IDF’s seismic detection systems time to ‎pinpoint the areas where the excavation took place.

The harsh terrain ‎also explains the nature of Hezbollah’s tunnels, which are straighter ‎and shorter than their Gazan cousins. Their advantage lies with the ‎fact that, being carved out of solid rock and not sand, like in Gaza, ‎Hezbollah’s tunnels did not require any cement lining.‎

‎ ‎The fact that Hezbollah had no idea that Israel had exposed its secret ‎project made it possible for the IDF to focus its activities and reach the point where it ‎could launch a surprise countertunnel operation and announce it had ‎mapped Hezbollah’s grid of tunnels in its entirety.‎

Gideon Markowicz

This was a dramatic statement not only because of the blow it dealt ‎Hezbollah, but also because it allowed the military to pinpoint the ‎operation to neutralize and destroy the tunnels instead of spending ‎months on a futile search along the border.‎

Prudence must prevail ‎

The suggested timetable for Operation Northern Shield ran counter to ‎the escalation in Gaza. The IDF consistently claims that it can take on ‎two sectors simultaneously, but when push came to shove, the ‎northern sector was prioritized. This decision stemmed not only from ‎the desire to effectively focus the military effort but also from a ‎consensus between Eizenkot and Prime Minister Benjamin ‎Netanyahu that tensions in Gaza were manageable even without a full-‎scale military campaign that would do little to resolve the enclave’s ‎problems.‎

Members of the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet were red in on the IDF’s ‎intelligence on Nov. 7 and were asked to greenlight a countertunnel ‎operation on the Israel-Lebanon border at a time of the military’s ‎choosing.

Four days later, IDF special forces embarked on a covert mission in ‎Khan Yunis, in southern Gaza, which went awry and triggered one ‎of the worst border flare-ups the south has seen since 2014. Emotions ‎in Israel ran high and the public and ministers alike demanded ‎something be done about Gaza “right now,” but Netanyahu and ‎Eizenkot did not falter, insisting in a Nov. 13 cabinet meeting that the ‎northern sector must remain the top priority. ‎

The cabinet agreed, with the exception of then-Defense Minister Avigdor ‎Lieberman, who resigned in protest, triggering political turmoil that ‎nearly toppled the government. Netanyahu hinted at “something big” ‎brewing in the north and called on all coalition partners to act ‎responsibly in what he called a “highly sensitive time, security-wise.” ‎

Incidentally, the timing of the operation was not chosen solely over ‎military considerations: The days leading up to it were clouded by a ‎well-founded suspicion that the plans were leaked to the media by a ‎senior politician, and there was concern that Hezbollah will learn of ‎them and Israel would lose the element of surprise. ‎

The disappointment by some in Israel may have stemmed from the ‎fact that the expectation for a spectacular strike on Lebanese soil gave ‎way to clouds of dust stirred up by bulldozers and rather exaggerated ‎media hype. It is doubtful, however, that Hezbollah shares this ‎disappointment – it lost a valuable strategic asset, in which much ‎thought, resources and efforts were invested.‎

We should not make light of this. Hezbollah is plagued by a serious ‎economic crisis that is expected to worsen in 2019 given the ‎impact of new U.S. sanctions in Iran, which is expected to slash its ‎proxy’s budget.‎

Unlike Hezbollah’s armament efforts, which can be presented as a ‎defensive measure, cross-border tunnels that snake into Israeli ‎territory are a clearly offensive move that exposes its aggression. ‎Worse still, the tunnel enterprise refutes Hezbollah’s claims that it has ‎no present south of the Litani, as stipulated in Security Council ‎Resolution 1701 that ended the 2006 Second Lebanon War.‎

Exposing Hezbollah’s tunnels has made it abundantly clear to ‎everyone, especially to the U.N. peacekeeping force stationed in ‎Lebanon – which for the past few years has insisted it sees no evil, ‎hears no evil and speaks no evil with respect to the Shiite terrorist ‎group – that Hezbollah has pulled the wool over everyone’s eyes.‎

Reuters

Still, Israel would be wise not to expect the U.N. ‎to revise Resolution ‎‎1701. ‎The U.S. will likely support such revisions, but ‎Russia will veto ‎such a move.

The tunnels’ exposure is, however, a golden opportunity ‎for Israel to call out ‎Hezbollah on the international stage, as they are a ‎unique ‎public diplomacy asset that ‎illustrates clearly what Israel has ‎been saying ‎about Hezbollah’s extensive web of lies, its ‎operational ‎plans and its ties to Iran.‎

This may also explain why Hezbollah has remained mum. A ‎speechless Nasrallah is a rarity but the organization has been stunned ‎silent by Israel’s feat, and its officials will likely prefer to keep a low ‎profile until the dust settles. ‎

Leverage is key ‎

Hezbollah is busy licking its wounds and performing damage control. ‎It is unclear to it what Israel knows, and how seriously it has been ‎compromised from intelligence and operational standpoints. ‎Hezbollah’s investigation will probably lead to Tehran, whose officials ‎were co-conspirators to the project. At some point, Hezbollah will ‎also have to retaliate, both because it is in Nasrallah’s nature and ‎because it wants to keep Israel deterred. ‎

The first test of deterrence will present itself after Israel will expose all ‎the tunnels and turn its attention to their destruction. The IDF will ‎have to decide whether to destroy only the parts that infringe on ‎Israeli territory or step over the border and eliminate their origins in ‎Lebanon as well. This means infringing on Lebanese sovereignty, ‎which Hezbollah could use as a pretext to respond. ‎

For now, Israel is being extremely careful about infringing on ‎Lebanese sovereignty. The guidelines are clear: Do not cross the Blue ‎Line, i.e., the border demarcation ‎between Lebanon and Israel set by ‎the U.N. This is a prudent decision, but it raises an important ‎question: If Israel is so concerned about stepping only a few hundred ‎feet into Lebanese territory to destroy terror tunnels infringing on its ‎own sovereignty, how does it plan to destroy the precision-missile ‎production facilities Hezbollah is trying to build in Beirut? ‎

This dilemma will be the next chief of staff’s to resolve, and he will have to do so against the ‎backdrop of Iran’s continued attempts to do everything in its power ‎to upgrade Hezbollah’s arsenal. ‎

Operation Northern Shield will take several weeks. The main effort ‎now is an engineering one and about 200 reservists, experts in their ‎field, have been called up for it. The military’s Commando Brigade is ‎securing the work and not by chance, as its presence on the border ‎will allow the IDF to mount a rapid response to any flare-up if need ‎be. The tactical threat is palpable and all it would take is a sniping ‎attempt by Hezbollah, for example, to trigger a conflict. ‎

It is doubtful the Hezbollah will do that. The tunnels were a strategic ‎asset but their strength lies in the (now defunct) element of surprise, ‎while ‎Hezbollah’s real strength lies with its sizeable ‎missile arsenal ‎and tens of thousands of operatives. ‎In other words, the fact that ‎Hezbollah lost its tunnels will do little to dramatically change the ‎course of the next war. Hezbollah is a mini-‎army of highly motivated ‎terrorists, and it can still cross the border relatively easy. ‎

Meanwhile, Israel will try to leverage its military achievement into a diplomatic ‎one not only in Washington but in other capitals as well, especially ‎Paris, which wields significant clout in Beirut, but also in London and ‎Moscow. After all, small victories are still victories.