WarSclerotic

Were it not for the U.S. midterm elections, the public and media’s ‎interest would likely have remained focused exclusively on the American ‎sanctions that were reimposed on Iran this week. Both Washington and Tehran are ‎still at the initial stage of trying to understand what this means, what ‎changes will follow, and what impact these changes will have. ‎

This uncertainty was evident in the Twitter blows Washington and ‎Tehran exchanged this week, as the sanctions were about to come into ‎force on Nov. 5. ‎

U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted a meme with the caption ‎‎”Sanctions are Coming” – playing off the catchphrase “Winter is ‎Coming” from the popular TV show “Game of Thrones” and even using ‎the same font used in the series – and Iran quickly responded, tweeting a ‎meme of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, ‎the black-ops arm of the country’s formidable Revolutionary Guard ‎Corps, featuring the similar font, reading, “I will stand against you.”‎

The sarcastic exchanges provided the desired social media buzz, but real ‎life soon took over and winter has come to Iran. Those who follow ‎Iranian media and its proxies could see a great deal of concern, at the ‎very least, over what the future may bring, especially with respect to ‎what the sanctions mean for ordinary Iranians, and in the larger sense, ‎for Iran’s regional interests.‎

Domestically, Iran has been under pressure for a long time. Hopes that ‎the 2015 nuclear agreement would significantly improve the dire ‎economic situation have long shattered, and present sanctions have and ‎will only make things worse. ‎

This has yet to be expressed in a mass revolt, but the Iranian regime has ‎had to face alarming sites this year: mass demonstrations in almost every ‎city and district, with explicit social slogans that raise clear questions ‎about the regime’s priorities, such as “Iran for Iranians” and “Enough ‎interfering in Syria and Lebanon.”‎

Jerusalem and Washington’s express hope, as explicitly stated by U.S. ‎National Security Adviser John Bolton, is that the sanctions will deepen ‎this internal crisis to the point of actually threatening the ayatollahs’ ‎regime. That, however, is doubtful: the regime in Tehran is strong and ‎over the past decade it has succeeded in crushing larger waves of ‎resistance, using demonstrative and deliberate violence aimed at ‎generating deterrence.‎

Still, the dilemma will present itself quickly enough, as a clash between ‎President Hassan Rouhani and Soleimani is only a matter of time.‎

Ideologically, they two are not too far apart as even moderates like Rouhani ‎are still radical and support Iran’s aspirations to possess nuclear ‎capabilities and expand its international influence. The difference is in ‎their strategies: Rouhani believes that the regime needs to invest at ‎home, bolster the foundations and venture outward only after the ‎situation stabilizes, while Soleimani wants to continue as before, and as ‎far as he is concerned, establishing Iran’s overseas interests is more ‎important than the suffering of the Iranian people.‎

In the meantime, Iran is trying to have it both ways, postponing what is ‎an inevitable decision. The pressure is felt not only on the Iranian street ‎but also by its proxies, namely in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the ‎Gaza Strip. Lebanon’s Hezbollah, for example, has had to enact ‎something of a “crisis economy” in recent months over the Iranian cuts ‎to its budget. Hamas in Gaza, which is always in dire economic straits, ‎also fears that the little Iranian aid it receives will soon dry up. ‎

Soleimani is the one facing this external pressure and he is finding it ‎increasingly more difficult to dispel the concerns expressed by Iran’s ‎proxies. Domestically, he will soon have to explain not only where the ‎money is going, but also what are the returns on Iran’s sizeable ‎investments. ‎

The Islamic republic has poured billions into its attempts to establish itself ‎militarily in Syria and in arming Hezbollah, to partial success at best. ‎Israel’s strategy in Syria has painted Iran into a corner that is very ‎different from where it hoped to be at this point, and in an age of ‎economic crunch, the logic of continuing to invest in expensive ‎weapons shipments that time and again fail to reach their destination is ‎bound to be questioned. ‎

This does not mean that Iran will cease exporting hostilities and terrorism – that goes against its rationale and against the current domestic ‎balance of power. The moderates may have the public’s ear, but they ‎wield little political power, especially compared to Soleimani, who is ‎ideologically and personally close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali ‎Khamenei. Nevertheless, Soleimani will also have to rethink his steps, ‎even if only tactically, until such time as things improve. ‎

These processes will take time and nothing will happen tomorrow ‎morning. All parties will try to understand and prepare for what will ‎happen next. The American sanctions in their final form are different ‎than first estimated and are more far-reaching on some issues than on ‎others. Iran still hopes that a mechanism can be devised to circumvent ‎them, but that is doubtful given the speed in which Western companies ‎doubled back on their desire to do business with Tehran so as not to lose ‎their business with the U.S. If anything, this proved what we have always ‎known – when money talks, bullshit walks.‎

Anyone who wants to know what will happen in the next systems needs ‎to follow the money. Iran, which understands this, is searching for ‎detours. For example, to have Russia sell its oil and transfer the proceeds ‎to Tehran in cash. The main benefit here will be declarative, in the sense ‎of defying the U.S. administration, even if it is not as pragmatic, as it is ‎doubtful whether this money will save the Iranian economy. After all, ‎Iran will need more than the support of China, Russia and Western ‎European countries to weather the storm.‎

This means that sooner or later Iran will seek a solution. One option, ‎which is not so subtly being hinted at is that Tehran will decide to go for ‎broke and make a mad dash for nuclear weapons or launch a war ‎against Israel in the north. The odds of these scenarios are very low, ‎simply because the regime in Tehran may be radical, but it is not suicidal. ‎The ayatollahs know that such moves would legitimize a stronger strike ‎against them, both militarily and economically, and that they will alienate the ‎few supporters Iran has. ‎

It is more likely that Iran will try to be flexible and pursue some sort of ‎negotiations with the United States, in hope of reaching a new agreement. In fact, rumors of such informal talks have been ‎swirling for quite some time.

In such a case, Iran will have to compromise, accept additional ‎restrictions on its nuclear and ballistic missiles program, as well as on its ‎export of terrorism, in the hope that at some point in the future, this, ‎too, shall pass. ‎

For Israel, every alternative is good news, because it pushes Iran further away ‎from going nuclear, even if only temporarily, all while diminishing the ‎threat it poses from Syria and Lebanon, which in turn spells lower ‎chances of a war in the northern sector. ‎