WarSclerotic

Twenty-seven minutes. That is how much time passed ‎‎between the Israeli military informing the Russian ‎‎army of its plan to strike Iranian assets in the ‎‎Syrian port city of Latakia and the downing of a ‎‎Russian reconnaissance plane carrying 15 crew ‎‎members by Syrian anti-aircraft fire trying to ‎‎counter the strike. ‎

The incident, and especially ‎‎its timeline, encapsulates the issues of Israeli-‎‎Russian coordination, safety margins, Syrian ‎‎amateurism and Russian callousness, especially given that the information relayed to the ‎‎Russians through the deconfliction channel ‎‎between IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv and the ‎‎Russian command and control center at the Hmeimim ‎‎air base in Syria includes much more than just ‎‎notifications about strikes – it entails exact ‎‎times, locations and flight paths. ‎

The Russians had plenty of time to ‎‎prepare. More than 10 minutes passed between the ‎‎notification of a pending strike and the strike itself, and ‎‎15 more minutes went by before Syrian anti-aircraft fire downed the Russian plane. The Russians had plenty of time to ensure ‎‎their aircraft would be out of harm’s way and ‎‎to coordinate with the Syrian army. ‎

That was not done, and a furious Kremlin ‎‎announced plans to deploy advanced S-300 air ‎‎defense systems in Syria and give Syrian President ‎‎Bashar Assad’s forces advanced identification systems to help them better understand who is ‎‎flying in their skies. ‎

Israel was taken aback by Russia’s rage over the ‎‎incident and the overt hostility that followed. ‎

Hopes that this was a case of fake fury that would soon ‎‎pass were quickly replaced with serious concerns. Some ‎‎irresponsible lawmakers were quick to declare that ‎‎Israel should “put Russia in its place” and show it ‎‎‎”who’s the boss” in the Middle East, but the top ‎‎political and military echelons were wiser.‎

The differences between Israel and global ‎‎superpower Russia are clear, said one of the officials ‎‎who participated in the discussions. All Russia has ‎‎to do is merely suggest imposing ‎‎sanctions on anyone who trades with Israel – as the ‎‎U.S. has done to Iran – and Israel folds ‎‎immediately. ‎

Sanctions of any kind are not really an option, ‎‎as Moscow has no interest in crippling Israel. However, it ‎‎does wish to put Israel in its place and ‎‎have it follow the rules – that is, Russia’s rules in the Middle East.‎

The Kremlin was never a fan of the Israeli strikes ‎‎in Syria, not out of fear that Russian soldiers might ‎‎be hurt but out of concern that these strikes might compromise its ‎‎regional position. For the most part, however, it was willing to look the ‎‎other way.‎

Israel spares no effort to ensure no harm came to ‎‎Russian troops in Syria, but the perception is ‎‎clear: If Israel is raiding targets near Russian ‎‎forces with alleged impunity it means either ‎‎that Russia does not care or that it has no interest in ‎‎putting a stop to that. Either way, Russia looks bad. ‎

But the Russian game is wider than the Israeli-‎‎Syrian story. It is aimed at Washington. It is not ‎‎for nothing that immediately after Russian Defense ‎‎Minister Sergei Shoygu announced that Syria was ‎‎getting S-300 missiles, Foreign Minister Sergey ‎‎Lavrov announced that he was prepared to discuss the ‎‎issue with the United States.‎

The intention behind Lavrov’s statement was clear: ‎‎If American forces withdraw from Tanf in eastern ‎‎Syria, Russia will reconsider providing the Assad ‎‎regime with advanced missiles. ‎

The truth is out there

Israel may be able to influence these moves, but in ‎‎a different way than previously thought. ‎

If until the Latakia incident it was believed that ‎‎Israeli-Russian ties could ‎‎weather anything, especially given the personal ‎‎relationship between Prime Minister Benjamin ‎‎Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin and ‎‎the coordination between the two armies, recent developments have proved ‎‎that Russia prioritizes its own interests, followed by ‎‎Syria’s interests – as it wants to benefit from the ‎‎war-torn country’s economic rehabilitation – and ‎‎only then does it consider other factors, such as ‎‎Israel’s security interests. ‎

Israel must go back to the basic ‎‎assumption that the United States is the only ‎‎superpower that will provide it with security ‎‎support. Coordination with the U.S. is critical, ‎‎especially in cases in which a superpower’s back-up is required.‎

It was fascinating to observe the back-and-forth ‎‎between Jerusalem and Moscow this week, especially ‎‎regarding the chain of events that led to the ‎‎downing of the Russian plane.‎

Israel asserted that there was no connection between its strike in Syria ‎‎and the Russian plane’s downing, blaming the ‎‎Syrian anti-aircraft fire alone.

Russia would not hear of this, claiming that ‎‎this was a case of the domino effect: The Israeli raid sparked the Syrian fire that brought down the plane. Ergo, ‎‎had Israel not attacked, the plane would not have been ‎‎shot down. ‎

But the Russian theory ignores the actual catalyst: Iran’s operations in Syria.‎

Moscow is by no ‎‎means a fan of Iran’s presence in Syria, but it ‎‎simply refuses to accept any explanation that does ‎‎not hold Israel fully responsible for the incident. ‎

Syrian President Bashar Assad and the ‎‎Syrian forces, whose amateurism cost the lives of 15 ‎‎Russian crewmen, are for some reason exempt from blame in the Kremlin’s eyes. The Iranians are not to be blamed either. Everything ‎‎begins and ends with Israel.‎

This is troubling on many levels, especially with ‎‎regard to the future outlook in the region. ‎

Netanyahu and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi ‎‎Eizenkot have invested considerable efforts in ‎‎establishing the Israeli-Russian deconfliction ‎‎channel. For three years, this mechanism worked seamlessly, ‎‎allowing Israel to strike Syria when necessary while ‎‎getting along with the Russians.

This era is over. ‎‎All we can do now is give thanks that this did not ‎‎happen sooner and do everything to avoid a ‎‎recurrence.‎

A similar incident could occur at any time, because all ‎‎parties are literally playing with fire. ‎

As far as we know, the Israeli Air Force has not ‎‎operated in Syria since the incident, although that could ‎‎change at any moment. The Iranians, who have paused ‎‎to re-evaluate the situation, will soon resume their ‎‎military entrenchment efforts in Syria as well as ‎‎their efforts to arm Hezbollah in Lebanon, and they ‎‎may choose to do both in a way that increases the ‎‎chances of Israeli-Russian friction.‎

This means every future Israeli operation in Syria ‎will be twice as sensitive, and not just because it ‎may encounter improved Syrian defenses, potentially ‎aided by Russian jamming efforts. Even today, any ‎raid on targets in Syria is very carefully ‎scrutinized and involves the highest echelons up to ‎the prime minister, but the long string of ‎successes – over 200 strikes in two years – has naturally ‎created a perhaps excessive sense of self-‎confidence.

But no more. ‎

Still, overall, the balance is favorable. Thanks to ‎the IDF’s operations, two years after making a ‎strategic decision to cement its presence in Syria, ‎Iran has no port in Latakia and no airbase in Homs, ‎and no real bases or intelligence facilities to support its proxy militias. ‎

Along the way, the Israeli intelligence and aerial ‎mechanisms have been honed and officials from all over the world ‎travel to Israel to learn from the Israeli Air Force.‎

Israel is something of a superpower when it comes to ‎operating behind enemy lines. Everyone knows this, ‎which may also explain some of Moscow’s ire. ‎