WarSclerotic

The message from the strike on the Syrian nuclear reactor is clear: Israel will not tolerate existential threats, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot said Wednesday, after the Israeli military confirmed it carried out the 2007 airstrike that destroyed a nuclear reactor b eing built in eastern Syria.

Although Israel was widely believed to have been behind the airstrike on the Deir ez-Zor facility on  Sept. 6, 2007, it has never before commented publicly on it.

Intelligence Minister Yisrael Katz suggested Wednesday that the timing of the revelation meant to send a message to Iran.

“The operation and its success made clear that Israel will never allow nuclear weaponry to be in the hands of those who threaten its existence – Syria then, and Iran today,” he wrote on Twitter.

A statement by Eizenkot said, “The message from the attack on the nuclear reactor in 2007 is that the State of Israel will not allow the development of capabilities that threaten its very existence. That was our message in 2007, this remains our message today, and it will remain our message to the enemy in the future.”

The chief of staff described the attack as “the most significant strike in Syria since the [1973] Yom Kippur War.”

Eizenkot, who was GOC Northen Command at the time, recalled learning of the reactor’s existence from a Military Intelligence official.

“I understood this was an unusual matter because he didn’t want to discuss it over the phone. When we met, he laid out the intelligence and all the details, the big picture, if you will, and I knew this was a significant event,” Eizenkot said.

“As a result, we adjusted the training program in the Northern Command. It was agreed that the only people who would be looped in would be me and the command’s intelligence officer, while the official story as far as the other senior commanders are concerned would be ‘improving war readiness.’

“In the summer of 2007, I briefed the senior commanders. I gave them a general overview of the intelligence on hand – nothing specific about the target and its nature – but I told them that there was going to be a very significant strike in the next 24 to 48 hours, and that there was a chance, albeit a low one, that it could lead to war.”

Eizenkot stressed that “the message was that the IDF had to be prepared for rapid escalation that could result in war. The past concept, that there is a ‘window’ during which the military can catch up – I don’t think that exists anymore in our neighborhood.

“Israel has been blessed with an outstanding intelligence community. The integration of forces is a multiplier of power with respect to our capabilities. This was clear then and I think that it has intensified since.

“There is always room for improvement, but this is a great example of intelligence cooperation that starts in one organization, moves to another organization and demonstrate an effort by the entire intelligence community to provide the military with the best intelligence in order to enable an optimal execution of the mission,” he said.

Gideon Markowicz

Israeli Air Force chief Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin said the current turmoil in Syria has further vindicated the strike, particularly since the reactor was in an area later captured by Islamic State militants.

“Marking 10 years since that operation and looking at the Middle East, we fully understand how much it has affected reality,” he said.

“Imagine what situation we would be in today if there was a nuclear reactor in Syria. In historic hindsight, I think Israel’s decision to destroy the reactor is one of the most important decisions taken here in the last 70 years.”

Norkin said the operation “began as a mission that could have dragged Israel into war, and culminated in a low-signature method of action that expressed the power and precision of the air force.

“This was a complex nighttime mission that required the type of courage and creativity we weren’t accustomed to before, especially considering that we were using fight jets that were only declared operational a few years prior. All these things combined – the cooperation within the IDF, the advanced technology used by the IAF at the time, the skill of the fighters and the decisions made within the military – led to a situation in which, at the moment of truth, it was possible for us to receive the green light and carry out the strike.”

Norkin said that “we focused our work on two axes: preparing all the scenarios for the strike, and preparing the IAF for a potential subsequent war. Only a handful of individuals were privy to the actual intelligence and many others were part of the preparation, but had no knowledge of the target. In each squadron, there was only one pilot who was the point man – the rest of the crews learned of the target only a few hours before the operation.

“Some of the fighters that led this mission currently man high-ranking positions in the military and air force, which attests to the quality of these individuals. To a certain extent, this was a double journey in terms of the inherent secrecy and the sense of national responsibility,” he said.