WarSclerotic

Light at the end of the tunnel, Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth, March 1, 2017

It should be noted, however, that those who praised Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, then-Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon and then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz at the time for their restraint during the unfolding events, which staved off embroilment in all-out war in Gaza and kept Hamas in power for fear of a worse replacement, are the ones now criticizing them.

*********************************

In the fight against Hamas and other terrorist organizations, decisions always have to be made: Should maximum force be used to win the fight in one week, despite the chaos likely to ensue as a result; or should Israel try to end the campaign taking into account the international community, Arab countries, the many civilian lives at stake, and the need for stability?

A decision has to be made, because you can’t have both.

In Israel, another factor must always be considered. The IDF is a unique army: On the one hand, it has to go to war to protect Israeli civilians; on the other hand, it knows in advance that any campaign of this sort also entails fighting for its reputation and defending itself against critical reports, from home or abroad. This has become part of the routine.

Operation Protective Edge was not a failure. The IDF did not lose. It even met its given objectives. With that, we would have preferred a quick “knockout.” Israel has the necessary superiority, weaponry and military to defeat a terrorist organization like Hamas and its satellites in less than 51 days. It should be noted, however, that those who praised Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, then-Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon and then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz at the time for their restraint during the unfolding events, which staved off embroilment in all-out war in Gaza and kept Hamas in power for fear of a worse replacement, are the ones now criticizing them.

We heard the pundits explain to us on Tuesday that the most notable part of the state comptroller’s report is that the Netanyahu-led government did not examine diplomatic alternatives to the military campaign in Gaza. Has so much time passed? Could it be we have already forgotten why we were fighting? Perhaps we have forgotten the abduction of the three boys and their execution at the hands of Hamas terrorists, which was ordered by the group’s leadership in Gaza?

Anyway, the mention of diplomatic alternatives is amusing. With whom would we engage diplomatically? With Ismail Haniyeh in 2014, or maybe today with his successor, Yahya Sinwar, who is even more of a militant extremist? Don’t take our word for it, go and ask the Egyptians or even our neighbors in the Palestinian Authority what they think of the diplomatic alternative Hamas offers the Middle East. If anyone wants to insult Yahya Sinwar, ask him what “diplomatic alternative” he proposes.

Israeli society does not like wars, even if it is very proud of its army. It does not like terror, it does not like Hamas and Hezbollah, and it also does not like grieving for fallen sons and daughters. However, what it likes the least are attempts to harm its “sacred cow,” the IDF. Israeli society sees this comptroller’s report as nothing more than self-pity and self-flagellation.

Yes, self-criticism is essential. The IDF examines itself after every operation and mission. With that, our desire today to perform an X-ray on everything we do is, in retrospect, hurting the army. It undermines the decision makers and mostly handicaps future operational capability.

In hindsight, a report that strives to fix things can actually do more harm than good. Fateful decisions are made by a small handful of people, unless of course we have decided to return to the days of ancient Greece. Moreover, who can say that decisions made by broader forums are necessarily better or more successful?

The underground tunnel threat was never existential. Indeed, Hamas could have had its victory image had it been able to carry out a deadly attack, via one of those tunnels, inside an Israeli border community. The terrorist organization could have also acquired that coveted image if the Iron Dome defense system had not intercepted the barrage of missiles fired at us from Gaza. Israel reasoned that the missile threat was greater than the tunnel threat, and provided a response which proved to the world that in Israel missiles protect civilians, while in Gaza civilians protect missiles.

Regardless, things have changed. Before the comptroller’s report was even published, Israel had displayed its answer to the missiles from Gaza. According to reports, it also has an answer to the tunnel threat. Hamas’ national projects are on the verge of bankruptcy.

Before the report was ever published, we already understood there was a light at the end of the tunnel. This light is not a diplomatic alternative, but a decisive victory over Hamas, if and when it makes the grave mistake of trying to harm us again.

Hamas on Tuesday claimed that it emerged victorious from Operation Protective Edge, but that is certainly not because of its performance on the field of battle. It is more because of the report.

This entry was posted on March 1, 2017 at 6:12 PM and is filed under Comptroller's report, Gaza, Hamas, Operation Protective Edge. You can subscribe via RSS 2.0 feed to this post's comments.

Tags: Comptroller's report, Gaza, Hamas, Operation Protective Edge