WarSclerotic

Is Iran really a defensive state?
J. Matthew McInnis May 13, 2015 2:25 pm Via AEIdeas

(Interesting reading. – LS)

On Tuesday, AEI released my first in a series of working papers on Iranian strategy and decision-making, titled “Iran’s Strategic Thinking: Origins and Evolution.” My first key finding may come as a bit of a surprise to some Washington audiences: Iran remains fundamentally a defensive state, principally concerned with its own survival. But everyone knows we worry about Iran’s expanding influence in the region, Tehran’s efforts to destabilize its neighbors, and its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. What gives?

These questions hit at the central conundrum all security analysts of Iran face. On one hand, Iran has been aggressive with its use of proxy forces and sponsorship of terrorism since 1979. On the other, Tehran has not initiated a direct military conflict in the past 36 years (and really for almost 300 years). Instead it builds its military forces around deterrence and retaliation. The bottom line is that it is really difficult to get the Iranians to go to war. Any military or defense expert who has participated in an Iran war game or crisis simulation in recent years, whether inside the US government or in the think tank community, will probably tell you the same thing.

So why does Iran avoid direct military conflict? First, Tehran would be severely challenged to seize and hold territory, or gain and sustain air or naval superiority anywhere in its immediate neighborhood. In comparison to any of the regional powers—let alone any of the world powers—Iran’s conventional military is simply not up to the task.

Second, their military power is first and foremost tasked to preserve the state. The Iranian leadership’s constant fears of regime collapse trump everything else. Iran’s military doctrines are primarily designed to defend against invasion from without, or to suppress insurrection from within, rather than launch offensive conventional military campaigns beyond its borders.

Third, Iran does not necessarily need traditional military dominance to achieve its foreign policy objectives—proxies and covert actions can usually get the job done. Using others to fight its battles also minimizes the risk of escalation to a conventional conflict, especially if there is some plausible deniability of Iran’s behind-the-scenes role.

I do not see Iran as a passive, benign actor. Quite the contrary. The Islamic Republic remains a revisionist state intent on reshaping the political, economic, cultural-religious, and security architecture in the region and the world. Iran is a threat to the United States and to our allies. There is no indication that any nuclear deal or desired de-escalation with the United States will change any of that, despite the hopes of some in the Obama administration.

This is also not a static assessment. Iran’s open proxy campaign in Iraq against ISIS may be a sign of a developing expeditionary mindset. As Iran modernizes its conventional forces or feels less threatened, it may become more militarily adventurous. Tehran still wants to be the regional hegemon. But analysts and policymakers must understand better how Iran’s leaders think they will achieve that status if the United States hopes to successfully shape Iran’s behavior, deter, contain, or defeat it. We need to ask honest, tough questions about why Iran does what it does. Read the report. Let the debate begin!

This entry was posted on May 13, 2015 at 11:43 PM and is filed under Iran. You can subscribe via RSS 2.0 feed to this post's comments.

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