WarSclerotic

Where is the right balance between Israel’s conflicting interests as they pertain to the events in Ukraine? It has no claim or stake in the future of Crimea, which has been essentially annexed unilaterally by Russia. It also has no vested interests in the actions of the separatists, who are acting on Russia’s behalf to tear the eastern part of the country from the capital Kiev. Is it a hostile takeover? Is it a domestic uprising? As it was said long ago, “It’s their problem.”

Not exactly though; while Israel has no preference on the outcome of the Ukrainian crisis, no one can ignore the fact that the United States expects Israel to support it, and when the U.S. is disappointed in this regard, it comes at a certain diplomatic price. For example, that Washington would not come to Jerusalem’s aid in the United Nations, on the Palestinian front, were Jerusalem to remain neutral on the Ukrainian issue.

But one can say that Israel’s interest lies in the other direction. Russian President Vladimir Putin is proving himself a dynamic leader, practical, able to create new facts on the ground. This is the situation as it currently appears, unless the pendulum swings against him somehow. A direct clash with Moscow, while it is notching victories (again, for the time being) no less, seems like an unnecessary headache.

In more sensitive talks, veteran diplomats have called into memory U.N. Resolution 242 issued in November 1967, which since then has been the basis for all Israeli-Arab negotiations, successful and unsuccessful alike. The starting point, according to its creators, and which has always been used to agitate Israel, includes the key sentence that has been ingrained into the mind of every Israeli diplomat since: “Inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”

The annexation of territories as a result of war is impermissible? The situations are not similar. Israel conquered Judea and Samaria in what was clearly a war of self-defense.

Even Israel’s harshest critic, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, accepted this. In contrast, Ukraine never provoked Russia, which justified its “price-tag” gangs taking to the city streets to undermine the government in Kiev.

They acted when Ukraine was holding tense debates over whether to democratically join the West, if at all, and Putin, with guile, moved to block the move while declaring he would enter a war of defense to protect the Russian-speaking population in the neighboring country. A government fell and rose in Kiev as a consequence. Nevertheless, Israel has been inclined to stay out of the matter, which provides an inherent bitter reminder of its own diplomatic issues.

Under these circumstances it is wise to take a modest approach. It is wise not to stick out; Israel needs to explain to Washington and Moscow that it wants no part in what is happening.

There is just one decidedly Israeli interest, which it gave up on years ago already and ceased properly fighting for: The welcomed increase — two and a half or three times the norm — of Jewish immigration to Israel from Ukraine.

Unfortunately, the land of Israel has always done a poor job attracting Jews. They came here mainly because they were rejected and pushed here by the Diaspora. Like the hooligans in one Ukrainian city who hung a poster that the time has come to expel the Jews. These are not ideal circumstances, but our arms are open regardless. Let them come en masse and let the Rabbinate refrain from raising difficulties. The Ukrainian exodus, 2014, this is what needs to interest Israel. Let it be so.