Another round, another deception
Another round, another deception, Israel Hayom, Emily Landau, March 20, 2014
(The only English language text of the P5+1 November 24th “deal” of which I am aware has enough “linguistic engineering” to make any con artist jealous. — DM)
A diplomat closely involved with the [P5+1] process was quoted as saying “linguistic engineering” was needed to hide modifications enabling the West’s reduction of proliferation problems. Linguistic engineering? Beware — it can boomerang.
As the world remains riveted by the crisis in Crimea, gleaning information about the second round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 over a comprehensive nuclear agreement has never been harder. Any reports there were focused mostly on the question of whether the Crimean crisis would affect Russia’s position in the P5+1. There was little reporting on the actual content of the talks, other than the fact that two issues were central to the discussion: the level of uranium enrichment in Iran, and the facility in Arak, which, if it keeps functioning at its current rate, could produce enough plutonium for Iran to have a nuclear weapon.
Despite the slight interest, the issues up for discussion, which must be answered within the framework of a comprehensive deal, are very serious indeed, and the gaps between both sides are still huge. Despite the U.S. government’s narrative, according to which Iran has upheld the conditions of its interim deal, halting its progress and even reversing the program, the reality is much more complex.
Iran has actually made sure that the interim deal does not affect the viability of its nuclear-weapons “threshold” capability. It concocted the “20 percent enrichment” notion as a bargaining chip. When it successfully maneuvered the international community into agreeing that the interim deal should not prohibit the research and development of new and advanced centrifuges, Iran realized it had nothing to worry about.
Iran has maintained huge stockpiles of 5% enriched uranium, and when it finally decides to enrich that uranium enough for a nuclear weapon, the advanced centrifuges will allow it to do so expeditiously. In other words, when it becomes equipped with centrifuges spinning at speeds much higher than those it currently has, the issue of 20% enrichment will lose all its significance.
What allowed Iran to manipulate the international community over its advanced centrifuges was the ambiguous wording of the interim agreement, which allowed the parties to reach an agreement from the outset without actually having to reach consensus. Iran exploited the ambiguity to contrive a comfortable interpretation for itself. One of the reports covering the current talks raises fears that officials representing the P5+1 have exposed themselves yet again to the same trap, this time involving the facility at Arak.
One of the ways to neutralize the potential dangers inherent in the operation of the Arak reactor is changing the facility’s technical specification. Of course, Iran will probably oppose the idea. A diplomat closely involved with the process was quoted as saying “linguistic engineering” was needed to hide modifications enabling the West’s reduction of proliferation problems. Linguistic engineering? Beware — it can boomerang.
One of the most unsettled observers of these talks is the U.S. Congress. A toughly worded letter signed by 83 senators was sent to U.S. President Barack Obama this week. The U.S. lawmakers said an unambiguous message must be sent to Iran warning of new sanctions if talks falter and Iran’s military program persists — rather “dramatic.”
Despite previous White House attempts to paint U.S. lawmakers supportive of ramped-up pressure on Iran as “warmongers,” these lawmakers’ true intention is simply to bolster the international community’s ability to effectively negotiate with Iran. The Obama administration should pay heed.
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