WarSclerotic

The latest report from the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) concludes: The interim steps under the Joint Plan of Action are not expected to seriously affect Iran’s centrifuge research and development program.

By Charles Artaxes

In the latest ISIS report titled “Iran’s Centrifuge Research and Development Program” published on January 27, 2014 the Author David Albright concludes that the interrim deal (Joint Plan of Action) in its current form is not expected to seriously affect Iran’s centrifuge research and development program.

“The interim steps under the Joint Plan of Action are not expected to seriously affect Iran’s centrifuge research and development program. These steps may delay the final development of new centrifuges that have not yet used uranium hexafluoride at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. However, Iran can continue development of several existing types of advanced centrifuges there. More significant limitations on Iran’s centrifuge R&D combined with greater transparency of this program should be included in the final step of a comprehensive solution, given that Iran’s development of more advanced centrifuges would greatly ease its ability to conduct a secret breakout to nuclear weapons.”

But even more importantly, he points out that it seems that the only site under verified limitations is the Natanz enrichment plant.

“Verified limitations imposed by the interim steps on Iranian centrifuge R&D seem to be restricted to the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz where uranium hexafluoride has been introduced into the centrifuges, which necessarily entails IAEA safeguards. Other sites involved in centrifuge R&D are not safeguarded under Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and do not appear to be monitored in any way under the Joint Plan of Action. Activity at those facilities would likely not involve the secret use of uranium hexafluoride, since this act would be a violation of Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However, this conclusion has not been confirmed by the IAEA and requires verification.”

It is not surprising that the number of centrifuge R&D sites is unknown.

“The number of Iranian facilities engaged in centrifuge R&D is not known. Moreover, the nature of the activities carried out at these sites is unclear. Nonetheless, these sites are likely conducting valuable R&D without the use of uranium hexafluoride, including design work, limited centrifuge manufacturing and assembly, and tests involving the spinning of rotors in air or under vacuum, often called mechanical testing. Mechanical testing is vital, and extensive mechanical testing would usually occur before a centrifuge would be brought to Natanz and tested with uranium hexafluoride. Afterwards, more mechanical testing of that centrifuge could also occur outside of Natanz.”

Worse and even more troubling is, that the sites which were involved in centrifuge R&D in the past are not under any IAEA safeguard and not subject to any kind of verification. He names explicitly three such sites.

“One of such unsafeguarded sites is Kalaye Electric, until 2003 Iran’s primary centrifuge R&D site and still an important part of its centrifuge research and development activities. Figure 1 shows commercial satellite imagery of the site in north Tehran.”

“One site that deserves further scrutiny is Farayand Technique, which is located in an industrial park in a valley near Esfahan. According to former senior U.N officials close to the IAEA, inspectors who visited this site during the 2003-2006 suspension suspected that the site could have been originally intended as a back-up to the Kalaye Electric facility or perhaps even as the pilot centrifuge plant. At the time, the site had two centrifuge test stands and a test pit, which would have been capable of mechanically testing centrifuges. Next to this facility was a large building under construction, which may have been intended to be the pilot centrifuge plant before the decision was made to establish it at Natanz. The Farayand building was far bigger than the building housing the pilot centrifuge plant at Natanz. In this case, Farayand Technique would have also served as a centrifuge assembly plant.”

“Another site deserving of scrutiny is Pars Trash, a subsidiary of Kalaye Electric located in Tehran that prior to 2004 was involved in centrifuge manufacturing and concealment activities aimed at defeating the IAEA’s efforts to uncover Iran’s centrifuge R&D program. This site received centrifuge manufacturing and development equipment from Kalaye Electric. It is located in Tehran among warehouses and light industrial buildings about a kilometer west of the Kalaye Electric facility. Prior to 2004, it manufactured centrifuge outer casings. Pars Trash was originally a small, private factory involved in making automobile parts. It went bankrupt and was bought by the Kalaye Electric Company, or its subsidiary, Farayand Technique. In February 2003, Pars Trash was involved in Iran’s concealment efforts. The facility stored centrifuge equipment that had been hastily moved from Kalaye Electric in an attempt to prevent its discovery by IAEA inspectors who were seeking access to that site. As in the case of Farayand, it is unclear whether this or possibly other sites have a current role in the production and testing of centrifuges, including advanced ones.”

All this shows us, if we didn’t know already, what a worthless piece of paper the interrim deal is.
Of course, its only worthless if the goal is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power.
If the goal of the US goverment under Mr. Hope and Change is a different one, as I suspect, then it makes perfect sense.

Read the full report here.

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