WarSclerotic

There is no reason to be happy about the latest round of talks in Geneva failing to end with an agreement. The sides have already agreed, more or less, on the framework of the deal and on some of its details.

More discussions will still be needed, and perhaps the Israeli protestations will move Western governments to try harder with Iran. But the deal is not far off.

The reason is simple: The Iranians are very much in need of a deal for sanctions to begin being removed, and the six superpower governments want a deal in the hopes that it will maybe stop Iran’s nuclear program.

Most facets of the deal which have already been agreed upon have already been made public, and assuming the reports are correct: The deal will be for half a year, during which the Iranians will cease enriching uranium to levels of 20 percent — which brings them closer to the ability to enrich to weapons-grade uranium — and will convert uranium that has already been enriched to this level to nuclear fuel rods. The Iranians will limit the number of centrifuges that produce uranium enriched to 3.5%, and will not activate the advanced centrifuges they have developed. They will not, however, be required to cease enriching uranium to the 3.5% level.

Additionally, the Iranians will not activate the heavy water reactor under construction in Arak, which will eventually allow it to produce plutonium and can also be used to make a nuclear weapon, but they will not be required to stop building it — which essentially renders the impending deal sterile because the reactor is not yet active regardless. The Iranians will also agree to stricter international supervision over their nuclear facilities.

It was France which delayed the closing of the deal during the last round of talks, arguing that the clauses pertaining to the Arak reactor and the existing stockpiles of 20%-enriched uranium were insufficient.

It would appear that the framework for the proposed deal is based on the right idea. The American government claims that comprehensive negotiations over the problematic aspects of Iran’s nuclear program will carry on for years, but in the meantime the Iranians will continue pushing the program forward. This will include activating their advanced centrifuges, will increase their stockpile of uranium enriched to 20% and making the Arak reactor operational.

Therefore, the initial agreement being proposed will freeze the nuclear program by at least half a year, and will perhaps even deteriorate it in other areas. In exchange the West will scale back its economic sanctions regime, but will not remove the primary sanctions. During this time period a comprehensive deal will continue to be negotiated, but if such a deal is not reached and the Iranians return to their current path, then the sanctions can be tightened again.

If a comprehensive deal is reached and is palatable to all sides, then all the better. But it still remains that the initial deal consists of glaring holes that detract from its advantages. Firstly, this deal can be effective against a nuclear program in its early stages, but the Iranian program is in a very advanced stage, and Iran is capable of producing several nuclear bombs within a number of months from the time it decides to do so. The proposed deal does not truly hinder Iran’s ability to make a nuclear breakthrough. Secondly, the promised sanctions relief appears to be more extensive than what Israel was initially told, will grant the Iranians greater economic breathing room for the duration of the negotiations with the West, and also in case those sanctions need to be reapplied. More importantly, if a final agreement is not reached then despite the reimplementation of sanctions there is no guarantee they will work, because many countries are not proponents of such sanctions to begin with.

Thirdly, the deal will effectively grant recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium — in contrast to the decision made by the U.N. Security Council that Iran has violated. This affirmation will be hard to undo. And what will happen if a deal is not reached after six months — will Iran go back to advancing its nuclear program under the claim that the superpowers have already recognized their right to enrich uranium and build the reactor at Arak? Another troubling aspect is also related: Iran entered these talks from a position of weakness, due to the sanctions. The United States, however — at least in Israel, Saudi Arabia and perhaps in Iran — is seen as lacking in toughness, to such an extent that even France is more stringent.

Imposing sanctions against Iran was made possible by the Israeli stance and its threat of military force. However, if the aforementioned deal is reached, Iran will also receive assurances that the U.S. will not attack it, at least while the deal is still valid. In this situation it will be very difficult for Israel to strike militarily, as doing so would nullify the deal forged by the Western powers. And when the military option is put on ice, the ability to pressure Iran is considerably less.

Dr. Ephraim Kam is a former deputy director of the Institute for National Security Studies and specializes in security problems of the Middle East, strategic intelligence and Israel’s national security issues.