WarSclerotic

Israel’s need to employ the long reach of its air force to stop Iranian weapons in Syria from reaching Hezbollah stems from the U.N. Security Council resolution that ended the Second Lebanon War in 2006, from which Israel emerged without reaching its operational goals and with a sense of defeat.

Israel agreed to end the war without a clear decision on who won the upper hand, making do with a U.N. resolution barring the transfer of weapons from Syria to Lebanon. But then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s government was too weak to impose the weapons’ ban, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah were mocking Olmert in broad daylight.

The arms shipments making their way to Lebanon now are the product of that government’s lack of resolve and as a result, Israel was late to define which weapons convoys would not be allowed to reach their destinations.

Short-term and short-tempered policies have created a convenient national — and almost international — consensus regarding the IDF’s need, according to foreign media reports, to strike the Hezbollah-Tehran axis on sovereign Lebanese soil; making it reluctantly choose a side in the civil war waging on the outskirts of Damascus.

The wisdom and necessity of the Israeli strike are indisputable. The West is using Israel as a mercenary to undermine Assad’s regime, and to that end it is willing to back the IAF’s operations.

Israel, however, needs to look beyond this immediate move and consider several factors: even if Assad opts not to retaliate over a strike on Iranian weapons held in Hezbollah bases on his soil, there is still the risk of a direct, violent confrontation with Tehran. According to Channel 2, a source close to the Iranian regime has already threatened retribution against Israel, advising it to “take it” and refrain from retaliating to avoid further escalation that could result in a regional war.

Nevertheless, Iran has to understand that Israel has made it clear over the past few years exactly where it draws its red line and what its casus belli is, even if at time it did not live up to its own statements. This time the government has to set a bar, minimal as it may be, and not go below it. It may raise the threat of a prolonged confrontation, but there is no other choice.

Israel has no interest in interfering in the Syrian civil war, nor does it wish to become a party to the ongoing fighting, as the rebels are no better for Israel than Assad. So when Iran sends a delegate to Damascus to review the situation, Assad, who is now overwhelmed by the burden of war, should tell him that if Tehran wishes to facilitate his survival, it should release him from his duties as the Lebanese terror group’s weapons supplier.