Pushing back the red line on Syria

Pushing back the red line on Syria – Diplomacy & Defense – Israel News | Haaretz Daily Newspaper.

President Assad crossed the red line on using chemical weapons, but as long as he does not lose them or use them again, Israel and the U.S. are hesitant to go ahead with an attack.

 

By | Apr.28, 2013 | 10:53 PM

 

A satellite image of al-Safir, Syria's main chemical weapons facility, near Aleppo.

A satellite image of al-Safir, Syria’s main chemical weapons facility, near Aleppo. Photo by GlobalSecurity.org

The fear of the Syrian Army using chemical weapons has moved to the level of operative decisions. With Israel and the United States in agreement that Syrian President Bashar Assad used chemical weapons at least twice and even able to identify the chemical used – sarin – there is pressure to respond to the crossing of the red line. And it’s not just the U.S. feeling the heat. Israel finds itself in the same dilemma, since its political and military leadership has warned that chemical weapons could change the theatre of battle from Syria to the entire region – including Israel.

 

But the red line is actually made up of two red lines woven together. One relates to the use of weapons of mass destruction and the other to the Assad regime’s loss of control over the stores of these weapons. While it is clear the ban on the use of chemical weapons has already been violated, despite the denials from Damascus, the weapons stockpiles are still in the hands of the regime. This is the reason for Western wariness of a military attack. In light of the threat of an external attack, estimates are that at least in the near term and as long as the Free Syrian Army and other militias do not gain a decisive advantage in the civil war, Assad will make no further use of chemical weapons.

 

At the same time, an immediate attack on the chemical weapons stockpiles could well create an even more dangerous situation, in Syria and the entire region. One of the possibilities is that an external attack would free Assad of any constraints on using his chemical weapons. As long as the attack is a threat, it serves as deterrence. But if the threat were carried out, it would no longer have this power. Another possibility is that bombing the bases where the chemical weapons are produced or the munitions are installed on the warheads of Scud missiles would spread toxic gases that will harm civilians and even cross Syria’s borders. An even more worrying possibility is that an aerial bombardment of the chemical weapons stores would immediately scatter the Syrian battalions guarding them and allow the Free Syrian Army or the militias, one of which is an Al Qaeda affiliate, to take control of the remaining chemical weapons left unguarded.

 

Another danger is that a bombing, even a very limited and accurate one, would grant legitimacy to direct military intervention by Iran or Russian. Iran and its representative Hezbollah have been operating in Syria for a long time now, but their involvement is only partial and in specific areas and significantly different than real military engagement.

 

The assumption behind all these scenarios is that Israeli and American intelligence agencies know exactly where the chemical weapons stockpiles are located. But this assumption is not necessarily realistic. There is agreement that the stockpiles are concentrated in five locations: near Latakia, in the area of Al-Safira in northwest Syria, near the city of Homs, in the area of Palmyra in the center of the country and near Hama. But about a year ago, the Syrian army moved some of these chemical weapons stores, and following Israeli and American warnings against Assad’s transferring chemical weapons to Hezbollah, there is no certainty that the intelligence agencies in the West and Israel know what was done with the weapons and where they are stored now.

 

These scenarios, along with the intelligence uncertainty, have forced Western and Israeli decision makers into an extremely complex dilemma. On one hand, the media pressure to act in Syria and respond to the crossing of the red lines is steadily growing – take as a precedent the media pressure during the period of the Second Gulf War. On the other hand, there are the threatening scenarios of a regional conflict, which all the parties have taken great efforts to avoid until now, even at the expense of the killing of some 80,000 people.

 

It seems that in the meantime, the decision to attack Syria will come only if and when the Western nations decide the time has come to get rid of Assad through the use of force and to use the attack on the chemical weapons stockpiles as the excuse. For now, the option remains on the table.

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