IDF received unspecific intelligence warnings ahead of Eilat rocket attack
The Iron Dome battery did not intercept the rockets likely due to Eilat’s complex geography – a relatively small strip of coast between Egypt and Jordan.
By Amos Harel | Apr.17, 2013 | 6:24 PM
The defense establishment had received unspecific intelligence warnings before the rocket attack on Eilat from the Sinai desert on Wednesday morning.
Assessing the situation earlier this month, the army decided to place an Iron Dome anti-missile battery in the area – the fifth deployed in Israel. (This was the system deployed on a limited basis to defend the Tel Aviv area during Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza last November.)
Deployment of the Iron Dome battery in Eilat made it possible to sound the alarm system in the city Wednesday morning. The old radar systems that were stationed in the city didn’t have the relevant capabilities.
On Wednesday, however, the battery was not triggered to intercept the rockets, which fortunately caused only light property damage. The army has not volunteered explanations on why the system didn’t operate when the rocket fire was detected.
We can assume however it has to do with Eilat’s complex geography – a relatively small strip of coast between Egypt and Jordan. It is a densely built-up area.
The IDF will have to examine the precise circumstances of the rocket fire and the response, but it must also take into account that under these conditions Iron Dome’s interception rate could be different from what we’re used to.
In recent weeks Israeli political and security sources have made positive statements about the cooperation with Egypt’s intelligence and army. Although these Egyptians are subordinated to a government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, the improved contacts stem mainly from Egypt’s stepped-up efforts to prevent weapons smuggling from Sinai into Gaza and Cairo’s pressure on the Hamas regime in Gaza to halt rocket fire from Gaza into the Negev.
But the Egyptian security forces’ functioning is limited, especially concerning their control over extremist Islamic factions in Sinai. Therefore Wednesday’s rocket fire, at least the sixth such incident in the past three years, shouldn’t come as a surprise. A Salafi organization claimed responsibility, saying the attack came in response to the killing of two young Palestinians near the West Bank town of Tul Karm less than two weeks earlier. Whether it was the work of this faction or another small group, it’s hard to believe that the Egyptians will deal with them firmly or be able to assure Israel that Wednesday’s rocket fire won’t repeat.
Before the incident in Eilat, IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz made statements for Independence Day expressing concerns about the situation in Syria. He warned that the calm in the Golan Heights for nearly 40 years since the end of the Yom Kippur War was now over. Gantz’s warning was perhaps also based on an intelligence assessment.
The situation on the Syrian and Egyptian borders is similar. Neither regime has effective control over the border area. The vacuum is filled by Islamic extremists inspired by Al Qaida. They seek to attack Israel, even though in the Syrian case, the fight against Israel still has a relatively low priority compared to the main goal of deposing the Assad regime.
In addition to a certain lack of intelligence, Israel’s problem is a lack of capacity to achieve deterrence against those extremist organizations. These factions don’t have assets they would fear losing. When Syrian soldiers fire at Israel, whether by mistake or not, it’s still possible to try to deter the Assad regime by hitting army positions.
Wednesday’s incident is also a sign of the current instability. Old concepts of deterrence, warnings and a balance of interests aren’t as valid as they have been for many years.
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