WarSclerotic

Iran has its fair share of troubles. It is under increasing pressure to change its approach on the nuclear issue. The country’s economy, burdened by sanctions, is deteriorating. This affects ordinary people, as well as a regime that needs to worry that such hardship will lead to domestic dissent. There is also a chance that Iran will be targeted militarily, even if this option has been somewhat marginalized for now.

In the past year Iran’s concern over the fate of the regime in Syria, and what its collapse could mean, has been added to the list. Syria is Iran’s only ally. They are both partners on the same path: the struggle against Israel and against American intervention in the region, and the desire to mold a radicalized Middle East. Both countries top the list of states that export and support terrorism, and both provide money and weapons to Hezbollah.

Hezbollah was created by Iran and is attached to it with an umbilical cord. Syria is the primary link in the chain connecting them. Iran uses Syria to build a Hezbollah-led Lebanon as the front line against Israel. It’s not surprising that the Syrian-Iranian relationship has been the longest lasting between any two countries in the Middle East — more than 30 years.

All of this could come crashing down and land a strategic blow against Iran. However, this is not an assured outcome: Maybe Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime will survive, against all odds. Perhaps the regime will remain but without Assad or his inner circle, within a framework of compromise with his rivals. Maybe Syria will descend into a state of chaos that Iran can exploit by forging allegiances with other groups fighting there by providing weapons and money, similar to its methods in Iraq.

But these are only small comforts. Even in such a scenario the alliance between Iran and Syria won’t be the same. For Iran, the worst-case scenario is if the Assad regime is replaced by one that builds close ties with the U.S. and the West in exchange for economic aid, distances itself from Iran and severs the link it has with Hezbollah and Lebanon.

The fall of the Assad regime could also encourage the opposition inside Iran, which has been dormant since 2009.

For these reasons Iran is doing everything in its power to help the Assad regime. It has transferred hundreds of elite soldiers from its Revolutionary Guard Quds Force, who are involved in devising the military campaign against rebel forces and training Syrian troops based on Iran’s experience in squelching its own opposition uprising in 2009.

After several Quds Force soldiers were captured by the Syrian opposition, the head of the Revolutionary Guard was forced to admit publicly that he had indeed dispatched a number of his officers to Syria for “non-military” advisory purposes.

Iran is building an armed militia, comprised of Shiites and Alawites, to help the Syrian regime. It has also given the regime electronic jamming equipment to disrupt media broadcasts, Internet service, e-mails and cell phone connections that could aid the opposition. Iran has also provided Assad with substantial financial aid to cope with Syria’s economic crisis, and is helping the Syrian president evade the sanctions imposed on his country; for example it is helping Syria with its oil exports.

Despite these efforts, Iran’s ability to help Assad is limited; its support only has the power to affect the fringes of the fighting in Syria. Iran cannot fight for him, and the units it has sent are apparently uninvolved in the actual fighting. The Iranian regime has never had experience combating a determined opposition the likes of which Assad is facing. The Assad regime’s fate will ultimately be determined by its own determination and ability in comparison to the opposition; not by Iranian support.

In this context, the latest strike against the weapons convoy destined, apparently, for Hezbollah, is a challenge for Iran as well. The Iranians are put in an uncomfortable position when Israel — according to foreign reports — hits two of its allies, without retaliation thus far. The Iranians may worry that the lack of a response will be perceived as weakness that could encourage Israel to also attack the nuclear facilities in Iran, despite the fundamental differences between the targets.

For Iran, and for Syria, it’s important to deter Israel from similar attacks inside Syria and Lebanon in the future. All of these factors notwithstanding, it is reasonable to assume that Iran will not take military action against Israel; not only because it is not directly involved in the matter, but primarily because doing so would provide Israel with substantive justification to attack its nuclear sites.

Dr. Ephraim Kam is the deputy head of the Institute for National Security Studies.