WarSclerotic

Iran plays a central role in the violent campaign being waged by Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel. Iran pulls the strings, but usually from behind the scenes. Intelligence officials may know the level of Iranian involvement in a given incident, but the public does not have access to such information. Intelligence analysts in the media make assessments, but they do not know with certainty what Iranian agents are up to in the field of battle.

This week’s events were precedent-setting. According to foreign sources, Israel conducted airstrikes on a shipment of SA-17 missiles being moved from Syria to Lebanon and on a military scientific research facility near Damascus. This unusual operation was attributed to the Israeli military and the Iranian Foreign Ministry responded with a message warning that the Israeli move would have significant consequences for Tel Aviv.

It stands to reason that Iran and Syria will be satisfied with issuing that warning, or perhaps an order to symbolically fire a missile from Lebanon into an open area of the Galilee region, but this is not certain. This is not even the main problem, however. The crucial question is not whether there will be a one-off response, but rather whether efforts to move advanced weaponry from Syria to Lebanon will continue. Israel can live with one-time rocket fire, but not the further arming of its nearby enemies.

Even if there is no response to the alleged Israeli airstrikes this week, it must be made clear to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah that Israel will have no choice but to fight them if Russian-made surface-to-air missiles are moved from Syria to Lebanon. This is a necessity. If Syria augments the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, Israel will respond.

In this respect, events on the northern front could come to resemble what happened on a smaller scale in the Gaza Strip. The western Negev region became accustomed to a reality of relentless rocket fire. This phenomenon could repeat itself in the north, but with weapons that are both more modern and more destructive. This is a recipe for all-out war, even if both sides wish to avoid it.

There is no way to know why Iran and Syria chose this moment to break the unwritten understandings with Israel about moving weaponry into Lebanon. It could have something to do with the unstable situation that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime finds itself in. It could also be that Iran and Syria thought that the weeks before the next Israeli government’s establishment would be a convenient time to change the rules of the game. But they must understand that Israel cannot accept a one-sided move against it, even if the move does not negate Israeli’s aerial supremacy in the skies over Lebanon.

The Israeli government must also make clear that a mysterious explosion in a remote town near the Syria-Lebanon border is not an acceptable reason to immediately threaten Tel Aviv. The response to a threat against Tel Aviv is not another Israeli strike in Maroun al-Ras (a village just across the border from Israel where a large battle took place during the Second Lebanon War). The equivalent of Tel Aviv is Tehran.

Israel has tried to stay on the sidelines in the wake of the popular uprising in Syria.

A whole spate of policy meetings have been held on the unfolding events in Damascus. They were convened in part because President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is the most senior member of the Iran-Hezbollah axis and is the glue that binds the two together. Thus, having him toppled could advance a whole host of Israeli interests. Not only could Assad’s downfall rupture the Iranian-Syrian-Lebanese contiguity. But it could bring Israel closer to Turkey, since Ankara is openly hostile to Assad.

Ultimately though, Israel chose not to intervene in Syria, and the warring parties have rarely accused it of abetting any particular side.

Despite the obvious temptation to harm an ally of Iran — in an era where Israel is almost singularly focused on the threats emanating from Tehran’s nuclear program — Israel made a wise policy decision.

The circumstances appear to be changing now. According to foreign media, the Israel Air Force attacked Syrian targets this week. That action, if it occurred, clearly constitutes a last resort. On the whole, Israel’s alleged actions did not elicit widespread condemnation from the world, despite the fact that the world is often hostile toward the Jewish State.

That said, Israel’s operation, if it took place, was not necessarily a one-off event. The Syrian regime has a large, and lethal, arsenal — whether chemical weapons or other weapons systems. These could fall into the hands of the rebels or even reach Lebanon. In the latter scenario, Israel’s air supremacy over the Land of the Cedars might be compromised.

The very fact that the crumbling Syrian regime is trying to transfer advanced weapon systems to Hezbollah may force the IDF to thwart this spillover. This is the classic definition of a last resort, a term that has guided Israel’s foreign policy and defense doctrine since its establishment, although not without controversy.

Israel is keen on averting a scenario in which it has to invoke the last resort option. It knows full well that the risk of escalation is real, but nevertheless it may sometimes have to take steps that could result in a regional flare up. It has no choice.