WarSclerotic

Hezbollah and Hamas Are Not Alone.

Atai Shelach

(Photo: AP)

In the past two years, states have found it increasingly difficult to assert their sovereignty over lawless areas. Terrorism is taking root in these ungoverned expanses, and is benefitting from advanced weapons that are within reach.

Hezbollah’s takeover of Lebanon exemplifies this trend. Built on a radical religious ideology, the organization established its headquarters in a weak country, growing with little interference, to become one of the world’s most notorious terrorist organizations. Hezbollah consolidated its strength within the borders of the host state, ‘incubating’ for a time by exploiting Lebanon’s weaknesses. It then established and operated through “institutionalized” organizations within the government’s entities, and eventually went on to operate within Lebanon’s military sphere. Hamas is another example of a group that has risen and grown in strength within the Palestinian borders. Originally a terror organization, it later developed into one with state and political sponsorship. Replicating Hezbollah’s pattern of activity, Hamas took ideology, loosely controlled territory, and a Zionist enemy (as a scapegoat to gain public legitimacy) to build its organization.

These two are the more widely known examples, but Hezbollah and Hamas are not alone. In the framework of the Arab Spring, terrorist entities have begun to spring up in uncontrolled territory – a phenomenon stemming from the weakened regimes. As the revolutions disrupt government order, various organizations are taking advantage of the opportunity to utilize their operational capabilities and popularity within the population to establish pockets of control.

How does this method differ from the past? First, it is important to note that the terrorist groups are not new – existing groups are exploiting the present chaos. They are slowly taking hold by using state or local assets as bases to train, gather weapons, strengthen, prepare, and eventually embark on terror missions.

Advanced weapons represent an essential issue in the organizations’ development. One of the main goals of every terror organization is to strengthen its position by acquiring better weapons. Terror groups are working day and night to keep their weapon supply routes open: from smuggling, acquisition, theft, and even the establishment of improvised workshops for weapons production. In most cases, they invest considerable energy to obtain advanced state-level weapons to upgrade their operational capabilities and to advance their world standing.

In this new reality, the time needed to obtain weapons and operational capability is very short. Usually, terror organizations need considerable time to achieve operational readiness due to geographic constraints, close supervision, the absence of training facilities and available weapons, and other reasons. In this new reality, the organizations already exist, training facilities and “fire areas” are abundant, supervision is lax, and weapons (including very advanced ones) are relatively available – allowing terror organizations to reach operational effectiveness very quickly.

The “Playgrounds”

Syria established numerous defensive infrastructures at the national level, and at the tactical and campaign echelons over the past four decades. According to foreign sources, terror organizations such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah are already based in Syria. The demilitarized buffer zone, based on agreements signed in 1974 after the Yom Kippur War, has long since turned into “officer residence neighborhoods” (military facilities). The day is not far – and may have already arrived – when various organizations establish terror dens close to Israel’s border in these “neighborhoods.”

There is a greater concern with regards to Syria that advanced weapons might find their way to various terror groups. Syria is teeming with advanced weapons, with an emphasis on its artillery rocket layout. One does not need much of an imagination to envision what might happen if they end up possessing even some of the existing measures.

Syria’s rebels already hold part of the country’s enormous stockpile of advanced weapons. It is quite possible that these weapons will reach (or have already reached) a terrorist organization. Given the increasingly volatile situation, not much more is needed for terror forces to direct fire against Israel as well. The motivation already exists, the weapons are present, and the territorial proximity is convenient, to say the least. The restraining elements that once existed, such as acentral government and regime, are nearly nonexistent, as most of Assad’s remaining energy is directed at the rebel forces.

Much has already been said about the smuggling relationship between Syria and Hezbollah. One of the more worrying phenomena, which may gain momentum in the absence of effective Syrian leadership, is the acceleration of the smuggling and delivery of weapons, especially advanced weapons, to Hezbollah.
Given the situation in Syria, it would be far easier for militant groups to obtain advanced weapons in large quantities and then transfer them to Hezbollah or another organization in Syria interested in attacking Israel.

Beyond weapons, Syria’s territory and its existing defense infrastructure, including advanced training areas and facilities, will enable terror organizations to train, gain strength, and establish numerous operational capabilities and qualifications.

In the Back Yard
The integration of terror organizations, defensive infrastructure, the close proximity to Israel’s territory, and the absence of state governance and sovereignty pose a serious threat to Israel, which could come from a terror attack from Syria or Egypt, or from weapons smuggled from other countries.

Given the existing and potential threats, a wide range of activities should be evaluated, starting from intelligence and up to operational considerations. What is important is to understand and internalize these threats and their techno-operational implications, and what far-reaching and troubling implications terror attacks utilizing state capabilities may have.

This entry was posted on November 25, 2012 at 1:37 PM and is filed under Uncategorized. You can subscribe via RSS 2.0 feed to this post's comments. You can skip to the end and leave a response. Pinging is currently not allowed.