“Pillar of Defense” – What Afterwards?

“Pillar of Defense” – What Afterwards?.

Former Head of the Counter Terrorism Bureau, Nitzan Nuriel, in a special column on the day after the operation, and if the objectives can even be achieved
“Pillar of Defense” - What Afterwards?

I am well acquainted with the Gaza Strip from the roles I’ve held in the past, as commander of the Golani Brigade’s Barak battalion and as Brigade deputy commander, as well as from thousands of hours discussing various issues which were, and remain, relevant for this impossible sector.

Yesterday afternoon saw the launch of an operational plan prepared by the best of our men, one which will see the participation of our best sons and daughters. They will do their best to bring the relative calm back to the country’s southern region, while attempting to intensify the deterrence aspect, which may even go as far as the eyes of “those sitting in Beirut” and the ears of those in Persia.

Yet it is still important to ask the question of the following day – what will come afterwards?

The following paragraphs do not lean upon a political doctrine nor do they stem from the world of science fiction, rather their source lies in the need “to turn over every stone”, to be creative and to dare.

In order to accomplish the objectives of the operation, there is need to connect between four efforts, each of which are useless all alone, and the challenge in connecting them is tremendous and requires considerable boldness.

The first component is to provide a severe blow to Hamas and its partners so as to overpower them, an objective which is a necessary yet insufficient condition.

The second component is to get the head of the Palestinian Authority to return to the Gaza Strip region (after toppling the Hamas regime), through Egypt, with three to four battalions from its security forces. These battalions were trained in Jordan by the US and are presently deployed in the West Bank, and this will allow him to return and control the Gaza Strip, which was taken by a bloody military revolution in 2006.

The third component is a quick plan, with international funding and cooperation (including on the part of the Arab world) to restore the Gaza Strip, so that Gaza will be restored as a place worthy of dignified living. This should be done in a relatively short period of time and led by Egypt, while orderly establishing a democratic society.

The final component is the recognition that the PA has returned to ruling over both parts of the Palestinian populace (the main reason that prevented progress with the PA in the framework of serious negotiations), and from this the ability to conclude what is required to fulfill the operation’s political purpose.

I am aware of the fact that in order to reach a worthy agreement with the Palestinians, further components which are no detailed here (such as the issues of the right of return or Jerusalem) are needed, and there is substantial difficulty in bridging them. However, without an honest, worthy attempt, then the purpose of the operation is temporary, partial and mostly does not plant the essential seeds of hope needed by both the Israeli and Palestinian sides.

During operation Cast Lead, I presented this direction to the decision makers; At the time, perhaps like today, this direction appears complex, tangled and one which entails risks. However, alongside the operation of force it has the ability for the component of operating the mind, which may place the responsibility on the shoulders of Abu Mazzen, providing him with an opportunity to act on behalf of his people rather than to go, pointlessly, to the UN.

And if it doesn’t? In contrast to the popular opinion, the “deterrence” achieved in Cast Lead, which was perceived as a successful operation, lasted for very little time (ask the residents of Israel’s southern region, or read the fire figures – quantity, timing and quality since the end of the operation). Compare this to the Second Lebanon War, which was viewed as a “problematic” war but established effective deterrence vis-à-vis Hezbollah to this very day. I believe that even Pillar of Defense will not be able to generate the necessary calm for long with regards to Gaza under Hamas, so in the best case, we will succeed in postponing the next round by a little, while hoping for a relatively cheap cost, but we will certainly not remove the threat. Experience points to the fact that after each round, the quality of the enemy’s recovery runs as deep as the blow it sustained, with regards to weapons and daring.

Alongside all of this, it is wise to stay alert to streams within the Israeli Arab population, as well as to Hamas cells in the West Bank, the Golan Heights sector and even Hezbollah expressions of solidarity, which raises the threat potential in the short range. Cyber, another potential arena, and Jewry around the world, which is in the Jihadi agenda, are also among the list of potential targets in this time. The defensive and security effort must accompany the offensive effort, alongside the political one.

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Brig. Gen. (Res.) Nitzan Nuriel is the former head of Israel’s Counter Terrorism Bureau. He served in the IDF for nearly 30 years, during which he served as the Ground Forces attaché in Washington and head of the Foreign Relations Division in the IDF’s Operations Branch among other roles.

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