WarSclerotic

As the war of words heats up regarding a possible Israeli military strike on Iran, now is the time to look at one of the key arguments used by those opposed to such an act of self-defense.

Time and again we have heard the question “Why now?” asked whenever an Israeli prime minister must make a decision that placed Israel’s very existence in jeopardy.

Each time, Israeli leaders knew to focus on the real question — “What is the alternative?” — and then go forward on the lonely path toward a more secure and free Israel.

There are many examples of such decision-making, but three stand out.

In the spring of 1948, it was far from an obvious decision that the pre-state Jewish community would declare its independence the minute that the British Mandate rule ended.

The nascent state had been, for all intents and purposes, at war since the approval of the November 1947 United Nations partition plan. As the British were preparing to leave, armed Arab militias were rising up throughout the Holy Land, and the Arab states that surrounded it had begun to amass troops and arms on the borders.

The Jewish leadership in Palestine was at odds about how to act. Most analysts warned David Ben-Gurion, who would become Israel’s first prime minister, that a declaration of independence would not be accepted by the international community.

In May 1948, Ben-Gurion was finally able to persuade a majority of the People’s Administration to approve such a declaration. The final vote was 6-4, with three members missing.

Almost half the members were positively considering the alternative of a U.S.-sponsored cease-fire and promises of support if they delayed the declaration. But Ben-Gurion understood that the time for a decision was upon them and that he could not worry about world opinion.

Another example was the Six-Day War. In mid-May 1967, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser expelled the U.N. peacekeeping force in the Sinai desert, which served as a buffer between Egypt and Israel, and began amassing troops in the formerly demilitarized zone.

On May 22, Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping — a vital waterway that international law had declared must remain open to all countries. As Egypt increased the number of troops in the Sinai, Israeli fears were compounded when Nasser signed military pacts with Syria and Jordan.

During this tense time, President Lyndon B. Johnson implored Prime Minister Levi Eshkol not to attack the Arab countries and promised increased aid and oil supplies to Israel if it waited for an internationally-accepted solution. The Israeli newspapers were full of editorials calling on the government not to attack without prior agreements with international powers.

In fact, in a cabinet meeting on June 2, 1967, the Israeli government decided not to attack and to continue to wait for the international community to provide a solution.

By June 5, Eshkol and his cabinet had had enough. They realized that no outside power, no matter how friendly, could be trusted to ensure Israel’s security or even survival. The decision was taken to launch a surprise attack that would guarantee Israel’s security for years to come.

A more recent example that is perhaps most analogous to today’s situation was Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s 1981 order to destroy the nuclear reactor in Osirak, Iraq.

As the evidence mounted in the late 1970s and early 1980s about Iraq’s nuclear program, the Israeli government was faced with a difficult choice. Saddam Hussein declared repeatedly that his country was working on a civilian nuclear program. All of Israel’s allies urged patience and spoke of the need to negotiate.

Once again, an Israeli prime minister is faced with a difficult choice.

The international community is urging Israel to take a wait-and-see approach. In the end, this is a judgment that can be made only by Israel’s democratically-elected government.

Danny Danon is deputy speaker of the Knesset and the author of “Israel: The Will to Prevail.” His column is distributed by McClatchy Tribune.