WarSclerotic

It was four months ago this week that the Knesset passed the first reading of a bill that would dissolve the house. The proposed date for new elections was Sept. 4, this coming Tuesday. Were it not for the secret, late-night deal between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Kadima chairman Shaul Mofaz, we would now be in the throes of a political climax replete with polls, analyses, and predictions.

Many criticized Netanyahu and Mofaz at the time. The criticism turned to outright scorn just 70 days later, when Kadima left the coalition. Then came the economic problems, which prompted many to remark that Netanyahu made the mistake of his life by not calling for early elections. Mofaz was lambasted even further, as his party began to sink so precipitously that some polls showed it was barely above the minimum threshold for entry into the Knesset.

Now, however, the tables have once again turned. A number of polls that have been making the rounds among political observers indicate significant gains in support for the Likud while the position of the Labor Party and Yair Lapid have been weakened. Kadima may not be the main beneficiary of the developments of recent weeks, but at least it is alive. Mofaz may have absorbed vicious criticism, but at least he is still around. The party chairman and his aides have assessed that Kadima would have vanished if elections were to have been held this Tuesday. Instead, he ran into Netanyahu’s arms on that fateful night.

Officials in various political parties are increasingly coming to the realization that the shift in favor of the prime minister could be attributed primarily to the insane chatter surrounding the Iranian matter. In this extravaganza, everyone – from Netanyahu, to Defense Minister Ehud Barak, to Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, to Mofaz, to former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, to former army chief Gabi Ashkenazi – is trying to make some political hay.

When Mofaz was elected head of Kadima, he announced his intention to lead the social justice protests this summer. Instead, the summer is nearly finished, and the protest proved to be a one-season wonder. Then Mofaz tried to lead the protest movement staged by the army reservists who sought universal conscription, but instead he resigned from the government and prevented the passage of a new enlistment law. It was Lapid who ended up reaping the dividends.

When Mofaz realized that neither of these issues would prove to be his saving grace, he began to desperately cling to the Iranian question as if it were his last hope. On this issue, he was convinced that nobody – not even Shelly Yachimovich or Lapid – could take credit away from him. The exclusive club of former senior officials who have emerged as Netanyahu adversaries, among them Ashkenazi, former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, former Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin, and Olmert, needs a leader. It needs someone who will be legally permitted to run in the next elections and who will not have to deal with cooling-off periods or criminal court cases. So why shouldn’t that person be Mofaz?

Observing the conduct of those who oppose an attack on Iran is a fascinating exercise. It is like watching a flock of sheep devoid of a shepherd parroting arguments that are shaky, if not downright absurd.

There was a virtual consensus regarding Iran up until recently. Public opinion was unified around the view that Iran should not be permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon, period. This was crystal clear to every Israeli. It wasn’t just Netanyahu who spoke along these lines. President Shimon Peres made unequivocal remarks on this issue, as did Mofaz. During his tenure as transportation minister, Mofaz single-handedly caused a spike in global oil prices after he was quoted as saying that Iran must be attacked.

What happened between then and now that caused this assessment to change? Why are some now expressing the view that it’s not so bad if Iran comes into possession of a nuclear bomb or two?

Aides to Barak and Netanyahu have no doubt as to the answer. They say that the officials who have spoken out against an attack are not motivated primarily by a concern that the mission would fail. On the contrary, they are worried it may succeed. A successful military operation in Iran, similar to the one ordered by Menachem Begin against the nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, would cement Netanyahu’s hold on power for many years. This is the last thing these skeptics want to see.

Sources close to Netanyahu and Barak point out that those who are most vocal in their opposition to an assault against Iran have been political foes of Netanyahu’s on matters unrelated to the nuclear question. Dagan had stepped down as Mossad chief an embittered man. The tensions between Barak and Ashkenazi have been well documented. Olmert’s political leanings are obvious, are as those of Mofaz. Rounding out the list is President Shimon Peres.

When examining this group, Peres at least emerges as the most consistent. He had opposed the Israeli operation in Iraq, which he feared would bolster then-Prime Minister Begin of the Likud. Now he has come out in opposition to an attack on Iran for fear that it would aid another Likud prime minister. The premiers may have changed, but Peres is still the same Peres.

Glued to the government

There will be no elections on Sept. 4, but one of the key questions that are nagging at the legislators during their parliamentary summer recess is this: When exactly will elections really be held? In other words, will Netanyahu succeed in winning passage of the 2013 state budget, which would thus enable him to survive in office until the end of his four-year term? Or will he be compelled to dissolve the coalition after the upcoming holiday season?

The debate over the Iranian issue has yielded two contradictory developments. On the one hand, Netanyahu, who has had to deal with a dip in popularity after the criticism he received in the wake of budget cuts, is once again on the ascent. The renewed surge of support is likely to encourage Netanyahu to call for a snap election. A number of Likud ministers have been urging the premier to do just that. The recent decision to put off early elections was ill-advised, they tell him. This week, he could have received a fresh mandate to rule and remained prime minister for years, they say, knowing full well how quickly the situation can change to his detriment.

On the other hand, Netanyahu’s recent surge in the polls is leading his coalition partners into an ever tighter embrace of the premier, with no desire on their part to say goodbye. They believe Netanyahu will be the one tasked with forming the next coalition, so why should they risk antagonizing him by opposing the budget?

Deputy Prime Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Shas chief Eli Yishai are worried about the prospect that after the next elections, whenever they may be, Netanyahu will have far more flexibility in choosing his next coalition partners. Instead of Shas, he could opt to partner with Lapid. Instead of Lieberman, he could pick Yachimovich. The extensive influence that Shas and Yisrael Beytenu wield in the current government may not be available to them in the next government. This may explain why neither of these parties is eager to expedite elections, thus making it more likely that they will approve the next budget.

The budget, however, does not appear to be the problem. It will indeed call for steep cuts, but, like all hot-button issues, the budget will be talked about in the headlines for a day or two before it is quickly forgotten. The budget will be approved in December, while elections will be held in October. Who would even remember?

The real concern is that the Israeli economy is on the verge of a major tumult and that the budget will not be enough to stop the coming recession, the wave of layoffs, and the sight of shuttered factories. Lieberman’s and Yishai’s worst nightmare is that public discontent over the economy will lead to early elections.

An election campaign with a dominant socioeconomic theme spells more trouble for Lieberman than it does for Netanyahu. The Yisrael Beytenu chief has nothing to sell to the voter on this issue. A bad economy just prior to elections could be good for Shas, but only if it is in the opposition.

Lieberman is adept at reading the political map. He knows that elections are likely to take place soon, and that he needs to set a new agenda. For the moment, the issue of ultra-Orthodox conscription is no longer relevant. This, in turn, has led Lieberman to do the thing he knows best: attack the Arabs. If Israeli Arabs were his main targets during the previous election campaign, this time around he has Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in his sights.

The security situation, particularly the Iran issue, is also keeping Yachimovich up at night. She has nearly nothing to offer voters on this front. Despite the fact that recent polls showed the party within touching distance of the Likud, Labor politicians are fearful that voters will not view the movement as a viable alternative to the Likud so long as it has little to offer in the way of defense expertise. As such, senior party officials are said to be working on a plan whereby Yachimovich would announce that Gabi Ashkenazi would be her pick to head the Defense Ministry in the event that elections are held on their originally scheduled date.

Ashkenazi will be eligible to enter politics as of Feb. 2014. The elections are scheduled to take place on Oct. 22, 2013. On average, it takes six weeks to cobble together a government. In other words, the next government could swear in an interim defense minister until Ashkenazi is permitted to take up the post.

Senior Laborites are also mulling the possibility of naming former Military Intelligence chief Amos Yadlin as their pick to be defense minister. Yadlin is the son of Aharon Yadlin, a former Labor Party member who served as education minister under Yitzhak Rabin. Yadlin will be eligible to enter politics in Nov. 2013, right on cue.

The rising star

In a week from this Sunday, the National Religious Party’s voter registration drive, which has stirred up a major fuss among the political functionaries of the nationalist-religious constituency, will draw to a close. The drive is crucial for the movement, which is preparing to elect a new chairman in November. For the first time in a long time, the party’s supporters have been engaged in a heated, spirited campaign full of intrigue and ideological tussle. This could be attributed to the candidacy of Naftali Bennett, who once served as then-opposition chairman Netanyahu’s chief of staff. Bennett also went on to become the director general of the Yesha Council.

Bennett views his entry into the National Religious Party as akin to a rising star that has burst into the sky of a functionary-dominated party whose days of glory are a thing of the past. He believes that the party is in desperate need of a major shake-up, one that requires it to eschew its gray, excessively religious image. He believes there is room in the party for those who do not lead a religious lifestyle.

Opposing him are those wishing to maintain the old order and dominant agenda, figures like Zevulun Orlev and Daniel Hershkowitz. While they agree that there is room for non-religious people in the party, they do not think they should be permitted to represent the party in the Knesset. How, they wonder, could an MK with no ties to the religious world fight for budgetary funds that would benefit the hesder yeshivas?

In recent weeks, the prime minister’s name has come up in connection to the rivalry between the warring parties. Bennett, Netanyahu’s former chief of staff, did not leave that post amicably. His associates accuse Netanyahu of intervening in the NRP elections in Orlev’s favor. The premier and Orlev have been wont to meet on several occasions, and Netanyahu has expressed support for Orlev in closed conversations.

It is reasonable to assume that Netanyahu is not too eager to see Bennett win, but it is quite far-fetched to suggest that he is actively working to aid Orlev. Bennett is soon likely to discover that his aides’ press briefings attacking Netanyahu are likely to come back to haunt him like a boomerang.

It seems that Bennett is trying to duplicate a strategy that is often employed by candidates in other party primaries. Amir Peretz was wont to accuse Yachimovich of being secretly in cahoots with Netanyahu. Tzipi Livni accused Mofaz of enlisting the support of Netanyahu. There were even those who hinted that Meretz chairwoman Zehava Gal-On was the premier’s preferred choice.

Not only have these attempts at spin failed miserably, but the NRP case is entirely different. Unlike the other parties, the NRP is a partner of the Likud, perhaps its most natural partner. Nonetheless, the major concern among NRP officials is that the bad blood between Bennett and Netanyahu could dissuade the prime minister from offering the faction a spot in the next coalition. The statements made by Bennett’s associates only serve to strengthen this fear.

Livni’s new gig

The Institute of National Security Studies is an independent think tank that operates under the academic auspices of Tel Aviv University. From its inception in Oct. 2006, the institute has maintained an appearance of an entity guided strictly by professional, apolitical considerations. This is reflected in both its studies and in the identity of its researchers. It is headed by Amos Yadlin. Among its researchers and experts one can find names like former national security adviser Giora Eiland, Dr. Shmuel Even, former Military Advocate General Avihai Mandelblit, and other highly respected and qualified individuals.

Two weeks ago, the institute announced that for the first time it would appoint an active politician to the post of senior fellow: former opposition chairwoman Tzipi Livni. Many political observers raised an eyebrow over the appointment. While Livni did resign from the Knesset, she has never concealed her intention to join a new political framework. She has even been a consistent participant in anti-government demonstrations.

What motivating interest did a respectable institution like the INSS have in adding Livni to its ranks? If it was shifting its policy on adding politicians, they could’ve found a number of more senior and accomplished individuals than Tzipi Livni.

Yadlin may be the nominal and managerial head of the institute, but in these instances one needs to follow the money. The INSS chairman of the board of directors is none other than Frank Lowy, the Australian billionaire whose name has been linked to a number of criminal investigations here in Israel, chief among them the Bank Leumi affair. Olmert’s name has been implicated in that case as well, though it is important to note that the investigation was closed and no charges were ever brought forth.

Lowy does not own Bank Leumi, but the friendship between the two men has continued uninterrupted. Just earlier this month, Olmert was invited for an evening of dinner aboard Lowy’s yacht, which was anchored in London on the historic occasion of the summer Olympics. Was Lowy the one who decided to turn his research institute into a springboard for politicians like Livni who are looking to climb their way back into the arena?

It seems that those who were either suspected of crimes, investigated for crimes, or convicted of crimes have always been a part of Livni’s immediate environment. After she surrounded herself with figures like Haim Ramon, Moshe Shahori, and Yoel Mugami, what possible problem would she have if her paycheck is signed by Lowy’s think tank?

In response, an INSS spokesperson said: “The institute favorably views its adoption of the American model whereby public figures who have retired from active political life continue to contribute their knowledge and experience in research institutions. As part of this effort, the head of the institute, Maj. Gen. (res.) Yadlin, contacted Ms. Livni and offered her an opportunity to join the institute and share with us from her vast experience. During her stint as a senior fellow, Livni will not be active in a partisan manner. The Institute of National Security Studies is an apolitical, independent institution whose views expressed in its research studies are not influenced by an outside party.”

A response from Livni’s office was not forthcoming prior to the publication of this article.