WarSclerotic

The Iranian nuclear project is one of the main issues in the strategic dialogue between Jerusalem and Washington, which, according to US Ambassador to Israel, Dan Shapiro, has become “more coordinated than ever.” This dialogue, which began in the early 1990s, focuses on intelligence and political affairs. In the field of intelligence, senior members of Israel’s security branches (the IDF, Directorate of Military Intelligence, and Mossad) meet regularly with their US counterparts for exchanges and updates.

Diplomats, military personnel, intelligence officers, and foreign affairs specialists attend the quarterly Joint Politico-Military Forum (JPMG) to share ideas on various aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. These types of strategic forums help to tighten intelligence cooperation and establish a base for joint policy. At the political level, the talks seem to be aimed at hammering out a strategic response in accordance with the parties’ intentions and capabilities. This dialogue, which takes place at the highest level of leadership between senior advisors, allegedly discusses the possibility of attacking Iran’s nuclear sites and determines the red lines that could trigger a military operation.

Timetable for the Iranian bomb

US and Israeli intelligence services nearly agree on the timetable for an Iranian bomb. According to the Israeli estimate, Iran is one year away from a bomb, and according to US estimates, Iran is a year and a half away from producing the necessary material for a nuclear warhead. The global debate over Iran revolves around the question of when to intervene. Israel believes that Iran intends to produce up to 250 kg of 20% enriched uranium – the amount needed for one bomb.

The Islamic regime currently has 120 kg of 20% enriched uranium. The shift from 20% enrichment to the 90% level required to produce a bomb is only a matter of time, not of knowledge and technology. The rate of enrichment at the 20% level is 10-20 kg a month. With Iran’s ten thousand centrifuges, only two to three months are necessary to upgrade the enrichment level to 90%.

According to assessments regarding Iran’s strategy, the Iranians could produce enough 20% enriched uranium for one or more bombs, halt production, and become a “threshold state” on the verge of military nuclear capability. The short transition to upgraded (90% enriched) uranium could be made whenever it suits them – secretly and rapidly – to stymie efforts at thwarting their nuclear program. The Israeli position, as its leaders have stated, is that Iran must be stopped before it reaches the threshold level, since afterwards, it will only take a few weeks to produce a bomb. An additional reason is that Iran could conceal the accelerated upgrading to 90% from UN monitors.

The US holds the position that their military capabilities (including strategic bombers and deadly bombs) are more powerful than Israel’s. They say that even if Iran reaches threshold status, Israel can trust the US to intercede. Obama explicitly stated this in his March 2012 speech when he said, “You can trust us. We’re committed to preventing the Iranians from crossing the threshold and producing a bomb.” But can Israel rely on the US? In short, this is the dilemma facing Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, Minister of Strategic Affairs Moshe Ya’alon, and the rest of Israel’s Political-Security Cabinet. These are the people that will ultimately decide whether to attack Iran.

Options regarding a nuclear Iran

The US-Israeli discourse has given birth to diverse opinions on the nuclear issue that could affect relations between Jerusalem and Washington. A political simulation game (Iran: A Strategic Simulation) held at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv in January 2012 found that an independent Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would damage Israel’s relations with the US.

Given this potential response, it is important to understand the leeway for response present in the dialogue between both countries. This is where the following initiatory response possibilities may be pointed out:

Diplomacy and Sanctions: The EU’s decision to cut off oil trade with Iran is a powerful expression of US policy. A key factor in the Iranian economy, oil sanctions could effectively pressure Tehran to abandon its nuclear plans. However, the problem with such a move is that it demands a broad multi-national consensus that the US – the leader of anti-Iranian policy – could find hard to muster. China and Russia, who are permanent members of the UN Security Council, oppose the crippling sanctions against Iran. Moreover, the European Union agreed to comply with US-led sanctions only after considerable hesitation and dissension. The difficulty in defining and agreeing on tough sanctions causes Israel to regard this move with suspicion and apprehension. Minister of Defense Ehud Barak declared, “If the sanctions fail to halt Iran’s nuclear program, action will have to be taken.”

Semi-Military Move: The US decision to dispatch an aircraft carrier to the Strait of Hormuz, despite Iran’s threat to blockade the strait if sanctions are enforced, is an example of a semi-military response. This move is designed to reinforce US policy that holds that the closure of the strait is crossing a red line that Washington will not tolerate. The use of military power as a deterrent is effective in that it also strengthens the deterring force’s credibility. The downside of such a step is that the situation could deteriorate and develop into a military confrontation that the US wants to avoid. If Washington backed down, its threats would prove to be merely the roar of a paper tiger.

Thus, Iran’s policy of brinkmanship, such as deploying naval vessels or even firing on US or Western forces, could weaken Washington’s credibility regarding its intention to guarantee freedom of passage through the strait.

A military attack: Israel’s position, the US’s position

The big question is whether Israel will attack Iran. The simulation research examined this issue from various angles (Israel’s capabilities, flight paths, chances of success, etc.) and drew the conclusion that such an operation would run counter to US policy, and if realized, would have a devastating impact on countries involved.

At the same time, senior US officials, such as Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, believe that Israel will attack Iran’s nuclear installations in 2012. While these officials are quick to point out that this is their personal assessment, their opinion nevertheless strengthens the credibility of Israel’s threat. Announcing Israel’s intentions to bomb Iran could exert pressure on the international community to implement a more rigorous policy against Iran. In other words, the community’s interest in averting a military action could mobilize joint international action to enforce harsher sanctions that might postpone, or even cancel, an unwanted Israeli move. US recognition of Israel’s intentions proves that the threat is a key element in the dialogue between the two countries.

However, there is a gap between American and Israeli perspectives concerning the use of force for attaining common political goals, along with Israel’s implementation of this threat. In view of all the ramifications and variables, how would a military attack impact US interests in the Middle East, Israel’s security interests, and bilateral relations? Indeed, this is a very complex, multifaceted issue.

It may be assumed that most of the statements emanating from the two parties are closely coordinated, but the statements also reflect a basic discrepancy. This is at least, how they appear.

The options and likelihood of realization

If the sanctions and a semi-military move prove futile, the question of whether or not to carry out a military strike will rise to the top of the agenda. According to most Western assessments, a military operation will not destroy Iran’s nuclear program – it will only delay it. In the best-case scenario, if the attack is executed perfectly, Iran’s program will be set back no more than five years. However, considering that its nuclear facilities are dispersed throughout the country (1,648,000 square km), most analysts believe that a military attack would postpone Iran’s attainment of nuclear capability by two to three years at most, and even this is uncertain. The targets of the attack would include the enrichment facilities, the production sites of the detonators that trigger the nuclear chain reaction, and surface-to-surface missiles that deliver the bombs or warheads. According to foreign reports, a number of attacks (mysterious explosions around the country) were carried out between 2008 and 2012 against targets linked to Iran’s nuclear project. Several Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated in operations attributed to Western intelligence agencies and the Mossad. There was also the case of an anonymous cyber-attack by the Stuxnet worm (allegedly produced by Israel) which caused heavy damage to Iran’s centrifuges, which have since been repaired. What options do Israel and the West have in the spring of 2012 as Iran approaches the nuclear threshold?

1. Israel could execute a military attack without informing the US. Reasons in favor: According to assessments in foreign publications, Israel has the capabilities (air and ground weapons, an elite air force, air refueling, long-range communications, and real-time intelligence gathering) to hit key targets in Iran. Israel also has the reputation of a country that boldly assumes responsibility for its own fate in matters of survival, as it did in the bombing of the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981. In addition, Netanyahu and Barak are believed to be preparing Israel for an attack and have the clout to get the Political-Security Cabinet to approve. Reasons against: An attack will cause only limited damage and incur heavy retaliation from Iran and its allies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon. If the attack is implemented without American consent, and US forces in the Persian Gulf are targeted by Iran, then US-Israel relations could be severely damaged. Likelihood of this scenario: medium to high.

2. Israel attacks Iran only after informing and coordinating with the US. Reasons in favor: Israel prefers to coordinate every operation with the US in order to preserve its strategic relationship. Reasons against: Full coordination will make the US an accomplice, and it is unlikely that the US wants this responsibility. Likelihood of this scenario: low.

3. Israel foregoes an attack and accepts the fact that Iran possesses a bomb. Reasons in favor: For decades, the US and Russia waged a cold war. Israel is aware of its military limitations and fears a strategic reversal in its relationship with the US. Therefore, Israel could eventually decide to accept the notion of a nuclear Iran and forego an attack, even while knowing that the US will not attack in its place. Reasons against: Theoretically, mutual deterrence doesn’t hold in Iran’s case given the regime’s messianic ideology. From Israel’s point of view, a situation in which Iran unabashedly proclaims its intention to destroy Israel, and at the same time possesses a nuclear warhead, is as bad as the price Israel would incur by attacking. An Iranian bomb will immediately limit Israel’s ability to retaliate against parties linked to Iran, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip. Likelihood of this scenario: medium.

4. The demilitarization of the Middle East, including Israel. Reasons in favor: A scenario in which Israel agrees to be supervised by international forces in exchange for Iran relinquishing its nuclear project could neutralize the Iranian nuclear threat without needing to pay a high price. Reasons against: It is unrealistic to expect that Israel and Iran would place their trust in bilateral demilitarization or that Israel would reverse its policy of nuclear ambiguity. Likelihood of the scenario: low

5. A US attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Reasons in favor: The US is interested in stopping a nuclear bomb that threatens its allies, including Israel and countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (the world’s leading oil suppliers). An Iranian bomb will motivate other Arab countries to attain nuclear capability. In addition, Minister of Strategic Affairs, Moshe Ya’alon, revealed that Iran is striving to obtain missiles with ranges of 10,000 km that could reach the US. The US has demonstrated that when its security and political interests are threatened, it doesn’t hesitate to engage militarily anywhere in the world. Therefore, if sanctions against the regime prove ineffective, the US might declare war on Iran or carry out a strategic attack. Reasons against: In 2012, the US is in the midst of a campaign in Afghanistan and still nursing its wounds from the war in Iraq. America’s economic weakness and domestic politics (2012 is an election year, and several months will pass afterwards until a new administration settles in) could prevent an attack on Iran. Likelihood of such a scenario: high.