WarSclerotic

The recent events involving Iran arouse a sense of deja vu. Let’s rewind a bit, shall we?

In 1994, the Clinton administration sent a loud and clear message to the regime in Pyongyang, signaling that if the North Korea developed nuclear weapons, Washington would not rule out a military strike. Then–U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry told NBC that he anticipated a military response from North Korea in reaction to severe sanctions that had been imposed upon it.

“We’re willing to take the risk,” Perry said. That year, Senator John McCain, who at the time was an influential member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supported bombing the Yongbyon nuclear reactor outside of Pyongyang even though he was well aware that such an action could result in radioactive leakage. Back then Washington spoke in the most forceful tone possible.

The U.S. was quite concerned about the possibility that North Korea would obtain nuclear weapons. Former President Jimmy Carter was sent to Pyongyang to persuade the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, to back down.

In October 1994, the North Koreans were prepared to halt their nuclear program. The International Atomic Energy Agency dispatched a delegation to Pyongyang to encase nuclear fuel rods that the North Koreans had manufactured. The ever-humble Carter quietly celebrated this diplomatic victory. One could dream.

But the negotiations with North Korea did not end there. President Clinton wanted to be sure that Pyongyang would renounce any future plans to develop nuclear technology for military purposes. He found a way to entice the regime, offering financial and humanitarian aid as well as help in building civilian reactors in exchange for a North Korean commitment to suspend its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang, however, had other plans in mind. While it was engaging the Americans in talks in 1998, it was also secretly developing a nuclear weapons program.

In 2000, a new president was sworn into the Oval Office. George W. Bush was suspicious of North Korea, a sentiment that was clearly expressed in his “axis of evil” speech in January 2002. Bush vowed that North Korea would never come into possession of a nuclear weapon. Bush’s attitude toward the 1994 agreement was similar to American conservatives’ views of arms control treaties that Washington signed with the Soviet Union in the 1970s.

We all know what happened next. The U.S. undersecretary of state, James A. Kelly, heard a surprising confession by the deputy foreign minister of North Korea who acknowledged that his country was secretly running another nuclear program. In response, Washington elected to suspend the 1994 Framework Agreement. North Korea reacted by expelling IAEA inspectors in December 2002. A month later, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Pyongyang denied that a uranium enrichment program existed, though it did concede that it was enriching plutonium in a plant located in Yongbyon.

In August 2003, Washington and Pyongyang made a renewed effort to end the impasse. At the time, six-party talks were launched in Beijing, with officials from the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea taking part. The talks revolved around an American pledge to refrain from actions aimed at removing the North Korean regime, while North Korea vowed to dismantle its militarized nuclear program. The sides discussed the return of IAEA inspectors into North Korea as well as the construction of a light water reactor, the removal of economic sanctions, normalized relations, trade, and the lifting of financial restrictions.

Ultimately, however, talks did not progress. They simply dragged on endlessly. North Korea even accused the U.S. of violating the terms of the agreements that the two sides had signed. In late 2005, talks were suspended after five rounds.

In early July 2006, North Korea conducted a missile test. On Oct. 9, 2006, it conducted a nuclear test. The U.N. Security Council responded by imposing sanctions.

This led to a resumption of talks. Both sides met in Beijing in February 2007. These meetings yielded an agreement whereby North Korea pledged to suspend its militarized nuclear activities. In exchange, it would receive humanitarian and economic aid. Pyongyang even shut down its nuclear facility in Yongbyon.

After that agreement was reached, North Korean officials invited then–IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei to Pyongyang. At the end of his visit in March 2007, he declared that “the discussions were quite effective” and that the authorities reiterated their pledge to rid the Korean peninsula of nuclear weapons. ElBaradei, an Egyptian diplomat, even spoke of normalizing relations between the IAEA and North Korea. He spoke quite optimistically — the atmosphere befitted a honeymoon. Once again, diplomatic victory was declared. Once again, we were dreaming.

In the meantime, the six-party talks were restarted. Pyongyang pledged to honor the February 2007 agreement, which stipulated that it would hand over a list of all of its nuclear installations to the international community. The Bush administration promised to grant tens of millions of dollars in aid to North Korea as well as provide tons of oil.

In July 2008, North Korea did abide by its pledge to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear plant. It even began demolishing one of the reactor’s engines. Still, that did not prevent it from reneging on all of its earlier commitments, claiming that the six-party negotiations were being held at a pace it found uncomfortable. Just as they did in 2006, once again the North Koreans cooked up a crisis. They knew why.

On April 5, 2009, North Korea tested a ballistic missile, which the U.N. Security Council denounced. More than a month later, North Korea announced that it had performed an underground nuclear test — marking the second time it had done so. The international community was enraged. This did not deter Pyongyang from announcing in November 2010 that it had begun work on the construction of a uranium-enrichment plant in Yongbyon.

Two days later, North Korean artillery units opened fire on the South Korean fisherman’s island of Yeonpyeong. The changing of the guard in December 2011 ignited hopes that a new era may soon arrive, but another missile test made clear to the West that it cannot expect much from the North Korean regime. This realization was reached much too late. North Korea is a nuclear threshold state.

The West was not smart enough to realize that the only communist dynasty in history — that of North Korea — sees nuclear weapons as the key to its survival. Staying in power is what guides Pyongyang’s foreign and defense policies. The regime, which feels threatened internally and externally, is unwilling to address its human rights record or tend to the needs of its suffering and starving population.

Back to the future

In light of the North Korean ruse and the contradictory messages coming from Pyongyang as well as the naivete of Washington and the IAEA, it is almost impossible not to search for parallels between the diplomatic standoff in the Far East and the one taking place closer to home involving North Korea’s ally, Iran.

In this case as well, there have been numerous rounds of negotiations and discussions. There have also been sanctions imposed as well as threats and promises made by the American president, Barack Obama, who has vowed that Iran would never become a nuclear power. This week, the head of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, visited Tehran and made optimistic statements about an imminent agreement.

Once again there is talk of a deal according to which Iran can enrich uranium to a level of 3.5 percent. The agreement will also include a gradual lifting of sanctions, normalized relations with Tehran, and the possibility of reinstating supervision over Iranian nuclear facilities. Just as the six-party talks with North Korea were held in nearby Beijing, the current discussions between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany are being held in Baghdad. The location makes it seem as if this is a deliberate attempt to give the aggressor the sense of a home-field advantage.

There are many parallels between the nuclear threat posed by North Korea and that of Iran, even if the Iranian threat is far more dangerous. Unlike North Korea, Iran calls for the destruction of a U.N. member state, Israel. Iran has regional aspirations as well as desire to continue its campaign of Shiite Islamic conquest that began with the Khomeini-led revolution in 1979.

Also, just like North Korea, Iran views nuclear weapons as a means to ensuring its survival. Just like North Korea, there is a dictatorial regime that cannot back down. Capitulation would be tantamount to humiliation, which means it intends on moving forward with the project designed to make it immune to foreign attacks while serving as source of pride domestically.

The dilemma facing South Korea and Japan in the case of North Korea, and Israel in the case of Iran, is the international community’s inability to sway an irrational regime to adhere to Western precepts and to persuade it to forego the development of nuclear weapons. Both Iran and North Korea have no plans to give up the dream, particularly after the lengthy roads they traveled. The cooperation between the two countries also serves as a motivating factor.

This week, Iran played the role of North Korea, while the world naively played the role of itself. Four days before the start of the Baghdad negotiations, The New York Times hinted at what was to come. The talks would be positive, and could even yield an agreement. But, if not, further talks down the road would eventually produce an understanding that would save face for Iran by allowing it to continue operating its centrifuges even if the uranium enrichment is at a level of 3.5%.

The international community could claim victory thanks to the renewal of IAEA inspections in Iran, including in the military base of Parchin, where suspicious nuclear activity is said to be taking place. Iran might even pledge to shut down its military installation in Fordo. There are even those who have entertained the idea that Iran may be willing to remove its uranium that has been enriched at a level of 20% from the country in exchange for fuel rods for a civilian reactor in Tehran. The Iranians already rejected this proposal during negotiations in Geneva in October 2009. Believing that the dictatorship in Tehran would be open to such a proposal requires a healthy dose of naivete. From Tehran’s point of view, agreeing to this would be total humiliation.

First, get elected

The assessments written in The New York Times, a newspaper that has excellent sources in the Obama administration, indicated two very important things. First, Obama wants an agreement that will ensure his re-election in November. Just like the regime in Tehran, Obama is also waging a battle for survival. This is mainly an attempt to paralyze Israel.

Judging from conversations with negotiators and journalists who attended last month’s nuclear talks in Istanbul, this writer noticed that the world is more fearful of an Israeli strike against Iran than of a nuclear-armed Iran. The economic ramifications of an Israeli assault could be harsh. Who would be willing to endure such a scenario these days, especially with the deteriorating euro bloc? That’s the last thing the world needs right now.

Officials in Jerusalem were ostensibly quite displeased over the emerging agreement, especially since it is clear to everyone that Iran is lying and is on its way to developing a bomb, just like North Korea. Iran, which attaches more importance to its global and regional stature than North Korea, will not hasten to withdraw from the NPT — but it will do everything in its power to circumvent the restrictions stipulated in the treaty.

While the IAEA chief was busy making rosy proclamations after his first visit to Tehran — and the first visit to the Iranian capital by an IAEA chief since 2009 — a new report from the agency in Vienna found that Iran had installed more centrifuges for uranium enrichment in its underground facility, proving that it seeks to increase its supplies of enriched uranium even as the international community demands that it ceases uranium enrichment activities.

Iran’s provocations

According to the forthcoming report, at least two sources claim that the Islamic republic has installed at least 350 centrifuges — in addition to the 700 it already has — at the Fordo site near Qom. This is the facility that Iran built secretly and that it is now being asked to shut down. If what is written in the report is accurate, then Iran is engaging in provocative behavior at a time when the international community appears to be willing to cut a deal at any price, despite the significantly harsher sanctions that it imposed on Iran in recent months.

Iran entered into the Baghdad talks without a noose tied around its neck. From its perspective, the threat of military action has become more remote, perhaps even nonexistent, so long as the U.S. presidential elections have yet to take place. Greece and Spain have been a more pressing concern for the delegations, far more than Iran.

This is why Iran responded to the West’s series of offers with its own counteroffer. In fact, Iranian officials expressed great disappointment throughout the discussions. The head of the Iranian delegation, Saeed Jalili — who has gotten so much media exposure at home that he has become more popular than President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — sent a subordinate to make clear that Iran expects reciprocity. For every Western demand, Iran expects to see the West lift sanctions that it has imposed.

“What you are demanding of us is much more than what you said or hinted to us in Istanbul,” said an Iranian delegate during a briefing with reporters.

At the same time, among the P5+1 group, China and Russia’s interests diverge from those of the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and France. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, said this week that Moscow gets the sense that Iran is willing to coordinate its steps regarding its nuclear program with the international community, though it wishes to do so within the framework of “reciprocity.” There is no doubt that the Russian statements point to the fact that Iran has already begun coordinating its steps with Moscow.

“Step by step”

Michael Mann, chief spokesperson for European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, told reporters in Baghdad about some interesting proposals that were submitted to the Iranians. Journalists in Baghdad covering the event, which ran until Thursday, were informed that the most problematic issue was the ban on uranium enrichment to 20%, something that is non-negotiable. The Iranians, for their part, made it clear that for every concession they make, they wish to see fewer sanctions.

Meanwhile, Iranian news media assailed the Western proposals as “incomplete,” “unfair,” and “anachronistic.” The ISNA news agency wrote that all of the Iranian proposals are based on the NPT and the principle of “step by step” reciprocity, which was agreed upon during the Istanbul talks last month. On Wednesday, Iranian media wrote that Tehran’s proposals were so clear that the West could have provided answers that very evening without the need to wait for further discussions.

“For the large power, the meeting in Baghdad over the Iranian nuclear issue is meant primarily to avoid war,” wrote the French daily Le Figaro. “At least until the American elections in November.”

The West is demanding that Iran cease uranium enrichment to levels of 20% and that it transfer its supply of enriched uranium to a third-party country. It also wants Tehran to allow IAEA inspectors to do their job at Iranian facilities.

It was the P5+1’s proposal that was transparent and clear, but why should Iran rush to accept it? Obama doesn’t want war, and even France is not as tough without Sarkozy in charge. “France has softened its position toward a nuclear Iran,” Le Figaro reported. “The new president, Francois Hollande, said during an appearance in Chicago that France “wants to give negotiations a chance.”

History certainly appears to be repeating itself. North Korea taught Iran an important lesson in handling negotiations. The faces change, but the story remains the same.