Israel – What Are Their Real Calculations for Security?
Israel – What Are Their Real Calculations for Security? » Publications » Family Security Matters.
Broadcasting its military intentions would be unusual for the tiny Jewish State of Israel. However one cannot ignore Prime Minister Netanyahu’s forceful speech at the AIPAC summit in DC in early March. Nor can the rhetorical spoiler in early February by the Secretary of Defense be ignored as he openly speculated on Israeli intentions as to the Iranian Nuclear program. So where does all of this war talk leave the issue?
Israel’s history in any dramatic military actions it chooses to execute is one where the intended targets are lulled by a cooling off of rhetoric and an overt military gesture that demonstrates a relaxed force-posture. Such was the case during Operation Opera in 1981, where an Israeli surprise attack against Iraq’s nuclear program caught the Iraqi Air Defense Network completely off guard.
Similarly, the Israeli Air Force strike against the Al Kibar Nuclear facility in 2007 in Syria came on after a nearly disastrous incursion by Israeli forces in Lebanon the preceding year. While reports gradually trickled out regarding the advanced state of the Syrian program, political undertones were present that Israel needed to impress upon its foes the effectiveness of its military. These foes are Hamas and Hezbollah in the immediate instances, but Syria and Iran ultimately.
This calculation is a key variable in the looming strike against Iran. Middle East politics is the domain of face saving, where perception of a government’s strength and will determine the level of respect accorded to it by its neighbors. Consequently, weakness is viewed as a provocateur that invites danger from adversaries. Similarly, the perception of strength staves off internal and external challenges to a ruling class. Much of Iranian politics in particular is designed around maintaining a façade of strength. That strength combined with its religious orthodoxy is tantamount to pure ‘thuggery’ in the western view. The perception of strength is enhanced by its overt support for terror groups that are openly at war with Israel.
Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran has played an expert game of brinksmanship where Israeli and U.S. interests conflicted with their own. However, the existential nature of the Iranian nuclear threat combined with its belligerence toward Israel and the west may now be a terminal course for the ruling mullahs. With Israel assertively stating its rights to defense, its preemptive history, along with the potential Iranian loss of face on the nuclear issue (were they to back down), means that one side must definitively prevail over the other.
The burden is far heavier for the Israelis on this issue. Often in Middle East politics, the avoidance of total defeat at the hands of a superior force is viewed as a victory in itself. This was certainly the case in the 1991 Gulf War when the coalition called a cease fire against Saddam’s army. Saddam was able to consolidate power, calls by the U.S. president for Iraqis to rise up resulted in a very public mass slaughter and the Iraqi government was able to recover much quicker from the humiliation inflicted by the coalition. In the present case of Iran’s position with respect to the nuclear issue, they can afford to lose a good portion of their military and the nuclear program itself. What they cannot afford is to do nothing in reply or endure a succession of setbacks.
If an Israeli strike is seen to endanger the stability of the regime in Tehran, the Israelis must see it through to allow the pent up frustrations of the Iranian street to believe a twilight moment for the ruling elite is at hand. This is a tall order in view of how the world left the Iranian street to the hands of the secret police in 2009. In any event Iran will no doubt throw the full force of its surrogates around the world into assaulting Israeli interests. These groups must face an early and stark choice as to whether they want to go down with their bosses.
For the part of the United States, it would be wise to play a supporting role in such a situation but in view of the administration’s obstinate refusal to back an Israeli operation, it is unlikely. Plus the freedom agenda that precipitated Operation Iraqi Freedom is no longer in fashion. Instead the idea of freedom oriented policy is a veil for apathy in the face of mass killings and political upheaval in a place like Syria, the Iranian government’s only erstwhile ally.
With respect to regional politics, both Israel and Iran have let their rhetorical positions lock them into intensifying confrontation. The consequences of Israel not acting decisively will be widely viewed as a victory for Iran. Though Iran aggresses against Israel on a daily basis through its terrorist accomplices, it would enjoy some cover as victim of the Israeli war machine. However, whatever momentum for change that may develop from an Israeli operation must be seized upon by the west. If these conditions evolve and go un-nurtured, the Israeli government may have to use the power of its military to assist that momentum. In sum, the stakes are more overarching than the imperative of denying Iran a nuclear weapon.
Should they choose to follow a path to a wider victory beyond the nuclear issue they may have to, once again, go it alone.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Paul Janiczek is a former White House appointee to the State Department. In that Capacity he served as a diplomat and an analyst in strategic issues related to Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons. He holds a masters degree from the Naval War College.
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WarSclerotic 
March 26, 2012 at 2:48 PM
Like i said : its no more an iranian nuclear issue, its the Iran who is the issue here. Iran armed with oranges is also dangerous for Israel , because of their rhetorics.