WarSclerotic

Behind the scenes of the latest round of fighting in the south, Israeli officials were faced with a dilemma: To what extent, if any, should Israel escalate the situation in Gaza? On the surface, it appeared that the Israeli leadership was faced with three possibilities. The first was to suffice with what had already been done and to work toward a quick resolution of this latest flare-up. The second choice was to exploit the momentum and to hit a number of other important targets, even at the risk of intensifying the fighting. Finally, the last option was to launch a wide-scale operation that would hit the terrorist infrastructure that has built up in Gaza.

The third option was ditched immediately. There were plans on paper, but no defense official was ready to recommend going forward with those plans, and no diplomatic or political official seriously considered it. Nobody in Israel had the stomach to embark on a complex military adventure in Gaza, the outcome of which is impossible to predict. It was clear to all that such an operation would exact a high price in blood on both sides of the border fence. It would also invite a massive barrage of missiles on central Israel, prompt a vicious international backlash against Israel, and detract attention away from the most important issue currently on the agenda – the Iranian nuclear threat.

The second option was more enticing. In the three years since Operation Cast Lead, Palestinians in Gaza have been engaged in an unprecedented arms buildup. With financial and logistical backing from Iran, Palestinians have imported a plethora of arms, weapons, and technical experts who are helping the terrorist organizations in the Strip upgrade their military capabilities.

Despite Israeli military efforts in the Red and Mediterranean Seas, the weapons smuggling into the Strip has shown no signs of letting up. The collapse of Cairo’s central government has allowed the highway of arms transfers to move from the 500 tunnels beneath the Philadelphi Route between Gaza’s Rafah and Egypt’s Rafah to above ground. Not only have Palestinian terrorist groups been able to get their hands on Iranian arms, but they have also managed to procure weapons that were bought, and stolen, from Libyan army caches. These weapons are considered by Israeli defense officials to fall under the category of “arms that tilt the strategic balance.”

Shin Bet [Israel Security Agency] and IDF officials are apprehensively monitoring the Palestinian armament drive that has continued throughout the year and whose goal is to deter Israel by tilting the balance of terror, similar to that of Hezbollah in the north. After prodding from the GOC Southern Command and the head of the Shin Bet’s southern division, IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz and Shin Bet chief Yoram Cohen supported strikes against individuals and weapons caches, even at the cost of a few more days of vicious clashes.

Last weekend, Gantz’s and Cohen’s position was accepted, and the go-ahead was given, but then Egyptian mediation came into the picture, effectively shelving plans for escalation. For all intents and purposes, Cairo gave officials in Jerusalem a pretext to choose their most preferable option from the get-go – the first one – of consummating a quick ceasefire.

The original objective of the operation was already met: the terror attack that the Popular Resistance Committee planned to launch from Gaza via the Sinai was interrupted, and, by all appearances, thwarted. What happened afterward did nothing to alter the previous assessment that Gaza was a powder keg that needed to be dealt with in such a way for Israel to restore an effective deterrent capability -a deterrent that would postpone the need to deal with the larger problem immediately. At least, that was the intention of the current Israeli policy.

Hamas’ embarrassment

This latest round of violence lasted 66 hours. It was shorter than the previous two rounds that preceded it (eight days in April 2011 and eight days in August of last year following the terror attack on Route 12). But although this round was shorter, it was also much more violent. Close to 300 rockets were fired from Gaza at Israel; 169 managed to cross the Green Line, while the rest landed in the Strip.

Of those that reached Israel, 103 hit open fields or landed in the sea. The rest threatened to hit population centers. Most of them had to get through the three Iron Dome batteries stationed in Ashdod, Ashkelon, and Be’er Sheva. Just eight rockets managed to get through the Iron Dome defenses, exploding in town centers. Fortunately, they caused little damage. One person was seriously injured, a few lightly hurt, and dozens were treated for shock.

In Gaza, three civilians were killed (including a father, his daughter, and a 14-year-old boy who happened to be near the launch site of a Grad rocket). Still, we should not kid ourselves. Despite the positive results from Israel’s standpoint, this week presented us with a number of worrying precedents. First, Islamic Jihad managed to wage a round of fighting almost entirely on its own. Although 18 of its rocket-launching crews were hit and 22 of its operatives killed, it did manage to fire dozens of rockets that reached deep into Israel proper while maintaining its arsenal for future confrontations. Even more disconcerting is that for the first time, Islamic Jihad has posed a serious leadership challenge to Hamas, which is being increasingly perceived in the Gaza Strip as a shying away from confrontation leaving the Islamic Jihad to battle for Palestinian honor. Clearly, Islamic Jihad is being goaded by Iran, which is fearful that when the chips are down it won’t be able to completely rely on Hamas. Islamic Jihad, meanwhile, will always be at Tehran’s beck and call. It has begun to solidify its standing as an attractive alternative to Hamas by gaining more followers and admirers. In addition, it has also developed a military capability that can do damage against Israel, particularly its long-range Fajr rockets that threaten to wreak havoc on central Israel.

These developments have not escaped the attention of Hamas. Its leadership, torn between the daily pressures of administering the Palestinian population in Gaza (pressures that were recently exacerbated by Egypt’s decision to suspend the supply of cheap fuel from Sinai, a move that ignited a serious energy crisis in Gaza) and the restlessness of the trigger-happy operatives on the ground, was eager for a quick ceasefire for fear that it would lose domestic political support as well as endanger its security assets, which are vulnerable to a more aggressive Israeli response.

The Egyptian interest

Acting solely out of its own interests, Egypt came to Hamas’ aid. The leadership in Cairo has never been weaker, but it does view the situation through sober lenses. It understood immediately that an escalation in Gaza and a high Palestinian casualty count could set off demonstrations in Tahrir Square that would initially channel the mob’s rage at Israel before inevitably being redirected at the regime itself. The Egyptian public could then demand that its government act against Israel by cutting off ties to Jerusalem. The new Islamist parliament in Egypt has already demanded this.

Despite the recent election results which apportioned a large share of parliamentary seats to Islamist parties, the Egyptian government has no plans to sever ties with Israel. It knows that the last vestiges of sanity in Egypt are contingent on Western support, American aid, and foreign tourism – three elements that are likely to evaporate if relations with Israel return to their pre-Camp David state.

Egyptian efforts to calm the situation began last Saturday, and they went into high gear on Sunday and Monday. Initially, the Egyptians asked that both sides make firm commitments – Israel would refrain from targeted killings, while the Palestinians would cease and desist from all rocket and mortar fire. Both sides refused, wishing to maintain room to maneuver and freedom of operation. The end result was a verbal agreement which was succinctly summed up by the chief of staff, who said, “Quiet will be met with quiet, fire will be met with fire.”

It took painstaking effort, but the Egyptians finally managed to impose this formula on all of the factions operating in the Gaza Strip. Hamas ostensibly signed on immediately. Even its overseas political leadership, which has been significantly weakened since it fled its former base in Damascus, pushed for the deal. The Popular Resistance Committees, which lost its second top commander in six months, were too flustered to pursue an independent policy, choosing instead to capitulate to Egyptian pressure.

Islamic Jihad was the lone holdout, resisting pressure until finally bowing to Egyptian demands and signing onto the truce. Frustrated over its inability to exact a heavier price in blood on the Israelis, Jihad continued to fire after the Cairo-mediated truce had officially taken effect, launching Grads at Netivot and Be’er Sheva. It did this just so it could claim that it had the last word in the fighting. Israel elected to show restraint and take solace in the restoration of quiet.

New Media in action

Israel could boast of four major achievements attained at the end of this round of fighting, two of which were operational (Iron Dome and the precision of its attacks on terrorist targets in Gaza) and the other two psychological (the public’s ability to withstand rocket fire and the public relations campaign).

There is not much to add about Iron Dome, except this: it is completely unreasonable for Israel to only be in possession of four batteries (the fourth due to be operational in a matter of weeks). Just as the government managed to scrape together a few billion shekels to build the security fence during the height of the second intifada, it must also tap into an emergency budget to pay for six to eight additional batteries – on top of the two currently in the production stages and scheduled to come online in 2013.

In a real war, one which won’t resemble anything we witnessed this past week, the batteries will be assigned to protect strategic sites as well as ensure the air force’s freedom of operation. This means that unless Israel has between 10 to 15 operational batteries at its disposal, it will not have the means to protect civilians from the tens of thousands of rockets likely to rain down on the north, south and center should a wider regional conflagration erupt.

On the operational side, the IDF did make headway in closing the gap between intelligence and on-the-ground action. The army’s forward command posts in the Southern Command succeeded in bringing real-time intelligence, both electronic as well as human intelligence, courtesy of the Shin Bet and Military Intelligence, to tease out and destroy targets. These capabilities required years of harnessing and perfecting, especially since the end of Cast Lead. This time, the army’s efforts achieved new heights of effectiveness and success.

The considerable efforts invested in avoiding Palestinian civilian casualties not only gave the IDF more room to maneuver from an operational standpoint, but it also gave it a leg up in the public relations department. On at least two occasions, the army was accused of killing innocent civilians. In the first instance, a Bahrain-based blogger posted pictures of homes on fire, proof that Gaza was burning from Israeli bombardment. In another other instance, a blogger claimed that the IDF killed children who were on their way to school.

The IDF Spokesperson’s New Media Division disproved both allegations by pointing out that the Bahraini blogger had posted old photographs while the other allegation was simply false. The information was passed onto the bloggers, who were quick to recant their earlier claims and issue an apology.

The army also showed improvement in getting out relevant information. The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit provided real-time images and film that allowed civilians on the home front to get a clear picture of what was taking place on the front lines. While this was warfare on a small scale and devoid of a large number of casualties on the home front and the front lines, the army is readily accepting the responsibility of being held accountable to a public that this week gave it an unqualified green light to act.

Nonetheless, it is worth considering the overall context: This was not all-out war, there were no deaths, Iron Dome was deployed, and significant protection was provided. These three scenarios are unlikely to repeat themselves in a more comprehensive clash. But those who observed the calm and quiet with which decisions were made and matters resolved on the national and municipal levels cannot help but be impressed as to how far the country has come since the system-wide meltdown so pervasive during the Second Lebanon War.

Matan Vilnai, who will soon wrap up five years as the top official in charge of protecting the home front, can certainly smile on his way to his new posting in Beijing. One can only hope that his ministry will be occupied by an individual who is no less dedicated (Minister-Without-Portfolio Yossi Peled would be perfect for the job).

A dress rehearsal?

In recent months, IDF chief of staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz warned that the situation in Gaza was flammable, and that an escalation was imminent. His statements contributed to Israeli deterrence, and it pushed back the fighting which took place this week at Israel’s initiative, namely the targeted killing of PRC secretary general Zuhir al-Kaisi. Israel was thus able to “attribute” responsibility for what was taking place in Sinai to the regime ruling Gaza. The significance of this is that any terrorist attack whose origins are in Sinai will lead to a response in Gaza, irrespective of where the attack is due to be carried out.

Those who are well-versed in the intelligence on terrorist activity in Sinai (and, by extension, Gaza) know that the next attack is just a matter of time, which means that the next Israeli strike to thwart the attack is also a matter of time. The Egyptian authorities, who were so efficient in getting the sides to agree to a truce, are incapable of putting a stop to the wave of terrorist activity that has nested in Sinai (some armed groups overtly conduct weapons testing in the peninsula). Cairo understands that the next incident is liable to spark a major conflagration on a scale that Gantz had in mind when he predicted a more intense campaign in the south in 2012.

From this standpoint, the events of this past week were just a test run, perhaps even a dress rehearsal, of what is likely to unfold when there is an even greater escalation of tensions. It could start in Sinai or Gaza, perhaps even in Tehran. It could happen as a result of an attack on Iranian nuclear installations or it could come as part of the ayatollahs’ efforts to keep Israel tied down in the south (or the north, or both).

These scenarios, which the IDF has prepared for in numerous practice drills and exercises, would put nearly all of Israel’s civilian population in the line of fire. The challenge that is to be assumed by the political and security leadership will be enormous, perhaps even unprecedented, given the responsibility of waging a two-front campaign in Gaza and Lebanon (perhaps in Syria as well). A war on this scale would also put Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan to the test.

Just as occurred this week, the results of the next campaign will be determined by the IDF’s operational effectiveness and the endurance of the home front. Unlike this week, however, Israel cannot make do with an unsatisfactory outcome that would just bring “quiet.” Instead, it will be required to achieve a result that would reestablish long-term deterrence, much like the aftermath of the wars against Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas following Cast Lead.

This campaign will be bigger in scope, violent, and brief. It will exact a price in blood here and, particularly, over there. Afterward, one can hope that quiet will reign for a long time. In the meantime, the calm is temporary, even volatile. How long will it last? It depends on the wisdom exercised by both sides. It also depends on a little luck. The events of this week proved that rational logic is at work in Israel and in Gaza, but luck was exclusively Israel’s domain.