WarSclerotic

The brutal leader of the 1979 Islamic revolution is a constant, inescapable presence as they go about their daily lives.

These days, however, those banknotes are not just a reminder of the zealotry that underpins the theocratic dictatorship established by Khomeini but also of the increasingly parlous situation it is in as the world – or, rather, some of it – intensifies sanctions against Iran.

They tell the story of a plunging currency that at one point in the past few weeks crashed to 80 per cent of its value after the European Union announced it was imposing potentially crippling embargoes on exports of Iranian oil, the backbone of the economy, as part of the international drive to force Tehran to back away from its nuclear ambitions.

It’s a story that, combined with accounts of widespread collapse across the economy, including substantial unemployment, the drying up of investment, food shortages and hoarding, gives hope to those who believe that, with the clock fast approaching midnight, sanctions can succeed and forestall a military strike by Israel that would have potentially devastating consequences.

Such optimism is understandable. Attractive though the thought of getting rid of the mad mullahs in Tehran notionally is, no one, given the uncertainties that surround possible military action, wants to see conflict.

But are sanctions a viable alternative? Can they work to make Iran see sense? More specifically, can they work within the timeframe rapidly evolving, with Israeli leaders warning that Tehran is fast approaching a now-or-never “zone of immunity” moment when its nuclear installations, far underground, would be beyond targeting?

US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has spoken of a window of opportunity for an Israeli attack between April and June.

Other analysts are reported to have identified a so-called “sweet spot” for Jerusalem’s military planners in September or October, a timing that is perhaps not entirely unrelated to the imminence of the US presidential election in November when President Barack Obama would have no alternative but to support any Israeli action or lose the Jewish vote.

So will sanctions work? Despite all the optimism surrounding the collapse of the rial, the signs are not promising, even with oil exports, the bedrock of the mullahs’ $352 billion economy, under threat and swingeing sanctions imposed on the international operations of Iran’s central bank, including its blacklisting by the SWIFT system banks use for global transactions.

For the grim reality is that despite the pledge of support for the latest round of sanctions by a good deal of the world, much of it remains uncooperative and is dragging its feet.

More than that, some large countries – notably that constant contrarian on the global scene, China, as well as Turkey and even India, which invariably claims the moral high ground for itself – are not just ignoring sanctions but are reported to be helping Tehran circumvent them.

Western security officials have been quoted as saying that China, Iran’s biggest oil trading partner, is playing a significant role in helping it avoid sanctions, and that the central bank in Tehran is using financial institutions in China and Turkey as clearing houses to purchase goods needed to keep the Iranian economy afloat.

Instead of paying for Iranian oil shipments, China is using money it owes Tehran to buy goods on behalf of the Iranians.

Banking institutions and traders in Turkey, too, are using the country’s easy access to European markets to circumvent sanctions imposed on Iran – even, according to one British report, buying up European financial institutions on behalf of Tehran.

Another main market for Iranian oil exports, India, is proving equally frustrating as Washington tries to win support for sanctions.

Pointing out that many of their refineries have been built specifically to process Iranian crude oil, Indian officials have made it plain that the country will have no truck with sanctions.

To drive home this point, it has announced it is sending a trade delegation to Tehran to talk business – hardly the act of a leading developing economy that has any intention of adhering to the sanctions demand. As well, however, the Indians are reportedly using sanctions to their own advantage, ensuring they get oil at cut-rate prices and paying in rupees rather than dollars.

Even in Japan and some countries in Europe such as Spain, whose troubled economy relies heavily on Iranian oil, there is little enthusiasm for sanctions.

Therein lies the rub for those who see sanctions as the best way to compel Iran to think again about building an atomic bomb: well intentioned and backed by the UN though many of them are, the reality is that, thus far, there is little discernible support for sanctions domestically or internationally in those countries seeking to bring Tehran to heel.

Historically, sanctions anywhere have invariably taken a long time to work, if they have worked at all. Sanctions, for example, had a devastating, long-term impact on the Iraqi economy, some reports claiming they caused the deaths of 500,000 children. But they did not stop the country selling oil and they did not get rid of Saddam Hussein. That was achieved only by military force.

Similarly, in Zimbabwe, a sprightly Robert Mugabe bats on undaunted at 88, his regime targeted by sanctions that are mostly ignored and have done little to end his dictatorship.

As it is, Iran has survived for years under a limited UN sanctions regime that has impeded, but not barred, its access to equipment needed for its nuclear program and oil and energy sectors, left it with a clapped-out civil aircraft fleet, and reduced its military capability by making it dependent on Russia and China.

But none of this has seriously undermined the mullahs’ hold on power, which is not surprising since sanctions are most likely to be effective in democracies where governments can be forced by popular discontent to change course.

According to one Iranian analyst, what’s missing is a moral imperative that will persuade Iranians that sanctions are right and that their government is wrong. Thus far there is no sign of that happening.

On the contrary, for the most part, the regime in Tehran appears undaunted, for while the rial may be on the skids, the mullahs can comfort themselves with the knowledge that global support for sanctions is at best patchy and that until they get more concerted international support, they are unlikely to bring the regime down.

They do, however, have potential. Oil sanctions and the blacklisting of the international operations of the Iran central bank are likely to be extremely effective in crippling the economy.

So, too, crucially, will a ban on insuring supertankers sailing to Iran, something expected to prevent 95 per cent of them going to take on oil.

But with the regime in Tehran as bellicose and uncompromising as ever and making dire threats to close the Hormuz Strait, it seems clear that sanctions are going to take time to work, if at all, and that they are unlikely to have any impact within the timeframe suggested as being most propitious for any Israeli (or Israeli-US) military strike.

Many commentators, indeed, believe that the over-hyped expectations voiced about sanctions, especially in Washington, have more to do with attempts to convince Israel to delay military action than any realistic expectation Tehran can be persuaded to change course.

Prospects that sanctions may eventually work are unlikely to persuade the Israelis against taking military action if they believe, as Defence Minister Ehud Barak and others do, that Iran is about to enter that critical “zone of immunity” he says will place Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure beyond reach.

Obama may wish it were otherwise, but a “now-or-never” deadline is almost certainly playing a critical role in Israel’s military planning, and few can doubt that, sanctions or not, the outlook for Iran and the Middle East during the next few weeks and months could hardly appear more daunting. Khomeini, the father of Iran’s brutal theocracy, still has much to answer for.