WarSclerotic

WPR Article | World Citizen: For Syria’s Allies, Attacking Israel Could Pay Off.

The worsening crisis battering Syria threatens more than the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. It also carries with it the potential to recast the balance of power in the Middle East, with damaging results for Iran and conceivably disastrous consequences for its allies — Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Given the magnitude of the stakes for these players, one can argue that it would make strategic sense from their perspective to try to lure Israel into a more intense armed conflict: not an all-out war, but clashes powerful enough to garner headlines and capture the attention and emotions of the Arab world.

The wars Israel fought against Hezbollah in 2006 and against Hamas in 2008-2009 showed that a conflict with Israel all but ensures a passionate groundswell of support in the Middle East. The players could then leverage that intensity of emotion to turn the tide of events in their favor. The battlefield experience, however, also showed that a sustained military encounter with Israel can take a costly toll in lives, ammunition and infrastructure. Hamas and Hezbollah, not to mention Syria, would rather not see their arsenals destroyed. But they could benefit enormously from the resurgence of support that would follow a dramatic news-making, face-to-face dust up with what they call the “Zionist entity.”

Achieving such a delicate balance — somewhere between serious clash and war — requires a degree of calibration that is all but impossible in the unpredictable dynamics of armed conflict. And yet, there is ample evidence that segments of Hamas, probably encouraged by Iran and Syria, have already begun to deploy this push-and-pull of provocation and restraint.

For the Syrian regime, it probably comes too late. Now that the Assad government’s heavy handed methods against protesters have left a reported 400 dead, it is much less likely that the Syrian population will be distracted by Israel. If Syria is to win this test of wills with the opposition, it will not do it by drawing attention to an external enemy.

For Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, however, the tactic could still produce results.

Iran has struggled with its response to the Syrian uprising, because it undermines Tehran’s narrative of the events unfolding in the Middle East. Tehran has expressed support for Arab uprisings in places such as Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen, arguing that the uprisings mimic the Iranian revolution of 1979. But Syria’s Assad is Iran’s closest ally. So while Iran has praised pro-democracy activists everywhere in the Arab world, it has berated Syria’s anti-regime activists, claiming they act at the behest of Israel and the U.S. Tehran would be well-served by images of heavily armed Israeli forces firing on Palestinians. Rather than being cast as the protector of a dictator like Assad, Tehran could again take the stage as the defender of the Palestinians.

Hamas could also gain from renewed fighting with Israel, but it also stands to lose the most. The risks it faces highlight the divisions within the Palestinian group, with the Damascus-based leadership inclined to push harder than its counterparts inside Gaza, who would bear the brunt of the clashes.

Assad has given support and sanctuary to the Hamas leadership in exile. His fall would deprive the Gaza-based Hamas of key support, and it would likely upend the exiled part of the organization, including Khaled Meshal, Hamas’ top leader who lives in Damascus under Assad’s auspices.

In addition to perhaps forestalling the loss of Assad’s patronage, renewed battles between Hamas and Israel would also raise Hamas’ standing among Palestinians, who have been pressuring the two main Palestinian political organizations, Fatah and Hamas, to reconcile. Indeed, Hamas and Fatah announced Wednesday that they have reached a preliminary agreement that would pave the way for an interim unity government and subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections.

Nevertheless, Hamas has reason to fear reconciliation, because in the years since it won Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, it has steadily lost support among Palestinians. Of course, the two sides have made deals before, only to see them collapse before being implemented. But should this agreement hold up, it will lead to elections, and Hamas would likely lose those elections. That makes any further loss of domestic popular support even more worrisome to Hamas. The Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority appears to be making diplomatic headway toward recognition of a Palestinian State, while Hamas’ policies have not achieved much. Clashes with Israel would engender popular sympathy and support.

Fighting Israel could also bring about a change in Egypt’s position regarding Gaza’s southern border crossing into Egypt. With Hosni Mubarak, the staunchly anti-Hamas former Egyptian president, now out of power, Israel can no longer be sure that Egypt will keep Gaza’s southern border sealed, as it has during past outbreaks of fighting. This time, Cairo, which brokered the announced reconciliation deal, might just help Hamas, at the very least by making it easier for weapons to flow from the south into the Gaza Strip.

The troubles in Damascus are also causing Hezbollah’s leaders in Lebanon to lose sleep. Like Iran and Hamas, Hezbollah has praised the revolutions in Egypt and elsewhere in the region, while condemning the one in Syria. Assad’s Syria has not only been the key conduit for delivering Iranian weapons to Hezbollah but also a vital strategic supporter. If Assad loses, Hezbollah loses. And there is no question that changes in Syria will have a powerful impact in Lebanon.

Without Syrian support, Hezbollah would have a much more difficult time preserving its dominance of Lebanon. If Hezbollah is perceived as weakened, its support in Lebanon will erode. Fighting against Israel would help to maintain popular support.

In recent weeks, attacks from Hamas-controlled Gaza have reached levels not seen since the last war. And there are indications that Hezbollah, too, may be planning an attack.

The tactic clearly puts Israeli leaders on the spot. They know that starting a war at this crucial moment in the history of the Middle East could be grievously counterproductive. Israeli strategists are familiar with all the reasons that Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah have for wanting a confrontation. From Israel’s perspective, they constitute the very reasons to prevent such a conflict from flaring up. But the recent series of attacks against Israeli civilians showed how political pressure can build on Israeli officials when the population is under fire.

Rocket attacks from Gaza create enormous anxiety in Israel even though they usually — though not always — miss their target. In recent weeks, attacks have left a trail of blood. Rockets have started landing closer and closer to Tel Aviv, adding to the concerns of military experts. When a rocket from Gaza smashed into a school bus, killing a 16-year-old Israeli boy, the pressure on the government to take action grew. For now, Israel’s deployment of the new Iron Dome missile defense system, combined with a limited military response, seems to have achieved the desired results: a lull in attacks from Gaza and a quieting of domestic pressures. But a new assault from Gaza or from Hezbollah, one with more deadly results for Israelis, could quickly change the equation.

While anti-regime protesters in Syria keep their focus on unseating the Assad regime, their uprising could end up causing explosions far from Damascus.

Frida Ghitis is an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor. Her weekly column, World Citizen, appears every Thursday.

This entry was posted on April 28, 2011 at 4:38 PM and is filed under Uncategorized. You can subscribe via RSS 2.0 feed to this post's comments. You can comment below, or link to this permanent URL from your own site.