Did Stuxnet Worm Its Way Into Iran’s Nuke Computers?
Did Stuxnet Worm Its Way Into Iran’s Nuke Computers? | TakePart – Inspiration to Action.
Someone in this building has learned the hard way not to surf porn sites at work. (Photo: Raheb Homavandi/Reuters)
If widespread speculation is true, a single computer virus may have accomplished what a bevy of international sanctions have failed to do.
Thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
The worm, called Stuxnet, is a sophisticated malware program that attacks the central nervous system of computers at high-value industrial sites like Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, where initial operations have mysteriously been pushed back two to three months.
The sophisticated virus is so large, so encrypted, and so complex, that dumbfounded experts assume it could only have been developed by an extremely wealthy private group or a well-resourced nation state—a fact that’s led some to believe the bug was created specifically to take out Iran’s nuclear program.
Whichever cloak-and-dagger party is responsible, it’s clear they tossed a massive amount of time, money, and know-how at designing the virus.
By reverse-engineering the worm’s colossal code, experts realized that the guided cyber missile is designed to attack a single, specific target.
“Stuxnet is a 100-percent-directed cyber attack aimed at destroying an industrial process in the physical world,” Dr. Ralph Langner told The Christian Science Monitor. “This is not about espionage, as some have said. This is a 100 percent sabotage attack.”
Although no one can say for sure how or when Bushehr got bugged, the act itself is technically brainless; releasing the crafty worm is as simple as inserting a Stuxnet-infected flash drive into a PC connected to the plant’s computer network, a task that could be carried out by a single covert operative, or an unsuspecting computer contractor.
After that, without mouse clicks, keyboard strokes, or any human interaction, Stuxnet is free to infiltrate the site’s cyber mind and control its industrial processes.
“What we’re seeing with Stuxnet is the first view of something new that doesn’t need outside guidance by a human—but can still take control of your infrastructure,” says Michael Assante, former chief of industrial control systems cyber security research at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory.
“This is the first direct example of weaponized software, highly customized and designed to find a particular target.”
The worm’s malware DNA was designed specifically to attack systems programmed by German-owned Siemens, Europe’s largest engineering conglomerate.
So who done it?
Connecting fuzzy dots may be more sport than science, but the two primary suspects behind Stuxnet—the U.S. and Israel—both have outward axes to grind with Iran, and both share cozy intel relationships with Germany, the historical home of Siemens.
In May, Germany voted alongside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to level severe sanctions against Iran and its nuclear program.
Although Iranian officials deny that Stuxnet is behind Bushehr’s cold, the virus has reportedly been found on the plant’s computers.
If Bushehr’s systems do turn out to be fully infected by the spyware on steroids, the prognosis may be terminal.
“After the original code is no longer executed, we can expect that something will blow up soon,” Langner wrote in his analysis. “Something big.”
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