Israel has its eyes on Hezbollah
Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs.
By Richard M Bennett
Tehran’s only genuine first strike or retaliatory capability against Israel in the event of an attack on Iran remains the thousands of medium- and longer-range missiles massed in Lebanon under the control of Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah. These weapons are an immediate and actual threat to most of northern and central Israel.
It would seem inconceivable that any planned Israeli attack on Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure could fail to seriously take into account that such an operation would almost certainly bring an immediate and incessant barrage of Iranian and Syrian-supplied missiles against Haifa, Tel Aviv and even Jerusalem.
The question that is being repeatedly asked by many defense analysts is whether Israel would try to combine a ground offensive launched against Lebanon with air strikes on Iran or whether it would launch a massive pre-emptive strike on Hezbollah before any attack is made on Iran itself, if indeed that is the plan.
The need to eliminate or at the very least temporarily neutralize the threat posed by Hezbollah must be uppermost in the minds of senior Israel Defense Force (IDF) strategists and planners.
Increasing Hezbollah missile threat
It has been widely reported that Hezbollah has been completely re-stocked with both improved and longer-range missiles by Iran and Syria since the inconclusive 2006 conflict with Israel. The recent rumors that Syria may now have delivered Scud B missiles to the Shi’ite militia raise the stakes still further.
The Russian-designed SS1 Scud, based originally on the World War II German V2, has been continually improved over the years, not least by Iran itself. The Scud B has a range in excess of 480 kilometers and would in theory be capable of hitting strategic targets in the Negev.
However, despite this, the Scud remains a crude and a largely ineffective weapon without the addition of a nuclear or chemical warhead. It is a large and complicated system that is difficult to use quickly and hard to hide effectively. Even though based much closer to Israel than those used by Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War in 1991, they simply are not a “war-winning” weapon, while their actual use could prove highly counter-productive.
Israel is certain to react with extreme violence against their users and may also seek to punish the supplier, namely Syria. However, until proof of the transfer of Scuds to Hezbollah is provided, there must remain a deal of doubt over the veracity of these reports.
Despite these doubts, Hezbollah’s arsenal of missiles does indeed pose a massive threat to Israel. The IDF AMAN (Military Intelligence) is aware that increasing numbers of Iranian long-range Zelzal-2 missile systems are being deployed by Hezbollah north of the Litani River and deep within the Bekaa Valley.
The Zelzal-2 has the range to hit most of Israel, though with a relatively small conventional warhead. These weapons are well hidden in prepared bunkers and are defended by increasingly effective surface-to-air missile defenses. Significantly, the Hezbollah base network could also come under the protection of the Syrian Air Defense Missile Command.
Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, the Israeli army’s chief intelligence assessment officer, recently told the Knesset (parliament) Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Syria had also transferred to Hezbollah about 200 M600 rockets that could carry a half-ton warhead and were therefore much more powerful than the Katyushas used in great numbers in the 2006 conflict.
It is widely considered likely that Iran’s response to Israeli or US air strikes on its nuclear facilities would be long-range missile attacks launched from the Bekaa Valley on major Israeli cities and a move by Hezbollah to re-enter the areas south of the Litani in order to bring thousands of their Syrian- and Iranian-supplied Falaq, Uragan and Fajr shorter-range rockets within reach of Haifa and most of northern Israel
It is unlikely that the largely ineffectual Lebanese army and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) units based in the south would be capable of actually preventing such redeployment by Hezbollah units towards the Israeli border.
The IDF has undoubtedly taken on board both the lessons of the 2006 war and the unwillingness of the international community to confront Hezbollah. Israeli commanders are also believed to now accept that air power alone is incapable of securing victory in the Lebanon.
It is believed that a significant number of senior IDF officers now favor pre-emptive action in Lebanon with an armored “Blitzkreig” penetrating deep into the central and coastal regions north of the Litani and particularly the Bekaa Valley as the only sure means of fatally disrupting Hezbollah’s command and missile infrastructure.
Any such large-scale military invasion would bring Israel into possible conflict with the Lebanese and Syrian armed forces. This, however, may well work to Israel’s strategic advantage as the degrading of Syria’s military capability in particular is likely to be high on Israel’s list of priorities.
It is thought likely in some defense circles that despite Syria’s close military cooperation with Iran and its undoubted links with Hezbollah, Damascus may well still seek to avoid open conflict with Israel. Syria has had many bruising contacts with the IDF in the past and will probably try to avoid giving the Israel military an opportunity to destroy much of its expensively rebuilt defense infrastructure.
However, caught between demands for positive action by both Hezbollah and Tehran and goading by Israel, Damascus may have no alternative but to take the risk and accept the probable dire results for its military.
Israel will face tough opposition
Hezbollah is tough, well-trained, highly motivated and it has proved itself time and again in battle against superior Israeli firepower. The fighters are not an enemy to be taken lightly and IDF military planners have placed great emphasis on devising new and improved tactics.
Hezbollah has dug deep to negate the effectiveness of aerial firepower and a vast network of bunkers and underground tunnels has been constructed in southern Lebanon and in the Bekaa Valley.
In 2006, Hezbollah did suffer the near total devastation of the Dahiya quarter in Beirut, the organization’s military and political nerve center; it lost the use of most of its carefully created bunker network south of the Litani, while its support groups in the south lost both property and personnel.
Significantly, Hezbollah also ended up on the receiving end of severe criticism from Tehran for allowing itself to be dragged into a premature war with Israel that clearly exposed Iran’s covert strategic planning to develop a retaliatory missile capability based in southern Lebanon.
However, its tactics still proved successful. Hezbollah did manage to survive the war severely battered but certainly not totally defeated. Hassan Nasrallah’s organization was ultimately saved by the unwillingness of Israel to commit major ground forces north of the Litani and deep into the Bekaa Valley.
This may well not be the case in any future conflict.
Without doubt Hezbollah, and its Iranian and Syrian allies, have also taken on board the lessons of 2006 and have sought to further develop its tactics and harden its defensive structures.
However, the IDF’s still considerable ability to strike at will at its opponents was highlighted by the failure of the Syrian air defense systems to detect the Israel Air Force non-stealth aircraft that destroyed a North Korean-built research facility in 2007.
According to the US magazine Aviation Week, Israel was able to disrupt Syria’s radar and air defense systems and render them totally ineffective during the IAF strike. The magazine claimed that Iran was especially concerned over the failure of Syria’s Russian-made radar systems. Iran uses much the same equipment to protect its nuclear facilities against air attack
In an attempt to counter this Syrian weakness, Iranian Air Defense Command, Control and Electronic Warfare units have reportedly been deployed to the west and north of Damascus.
This scenario may be far more complicated in that it is not certain when or if Israel will be confident enough to tackle the large number of strategically important targets in Iran without significant US military participation.
A joint strike by the US and Israel would be an entirely different matter. For despite the obvious risk of Iran retaliating by attacking not only Israel, but other targets of grave concern to Washington such as the vast oil fields in the Gulf and the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, Tehran would be left in little doubt that to do so would invite the systematic destruction of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Alone Israel cannot offer this threat in the aftermath of a surgical strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Iran too would be more willing to retaliate against Israel under these circumstances and it has the means to do so in the form of Hezbollah’s missile arsenal.
Israel may, in the absence of any US decision to use military force, opt for a pre-emptive strike on Hezbollah or a simultaneous air strike on Iran and a major ground invasion of Lebanon.
There is yet another option apart from the obvious one of simply learning to live with Iran’s nuclear program and that is in the aftermath of an attack on Iran it might prove both a political and diplomatic necessity to allow the first barrage of missiles to cause carnage and destruction in northern Israel in order to win widespread international support for a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, the attempt to destroy Hezbollah and the consequent high risk of significant civilian casualties.
Iran on the brink
While few seriously want a third Lebanese war this summer, it cannot be denied that the situation is increasingly unstable and talk of a renewed conflict is common. There are even well-placed sources who claim that senior Israeli military commanders are itching for another chance of destroying Hezbollah.
The comments made by IDF General Yossi Baidatz, when added to those of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that “Hezbollah has more missiles than most governments” and Jordan’s King Abdullah that “A war could break out this summer” help to create the suspicion that Israel may soon feel that it has no other choice but to launch a pre-emptive attack. To many in Israel it’s not the Iranian nuclear program that poses an immediate threat, but rather the multitude of missiles held by Hezbollah.
There remains, however, the slim possibility that the destruction of a significant part of Hezbollah’s missile threat to Israel and the window of opportunity it would provide for a strike against Iran‘s nuclear program may cause Tehran to have second thoughts about the true value of its current policies and its attitude to negotiations with Western powers.
This could provide diplomats with the welcome opportunity for compromise before the specter of another war becomes a reality.
Richard M Bennett is an intelligence analyst with AFI Research, a leading authority on national security, global intelligence, conflicts and defense.
Explore posts in the same categories: Iran / Israel War
WarSclerotic 
Leave a comment